In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful

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the U.S. Espionage Den's Documents
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In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Benificient.

Foreword

The documents contained in the books 25 to 28 of the collection of the documents of the 'Den of Espionage', which were previously published and headlined as "The Moderates", generally introduced the supporters of the illegitimate interests of the U. S. A. and the plans and ambitions of the U. S. administration in activating the moderates' trend to finally substitute it for the Line of the Imam and revolution. It is to be kept in mind that these documents belonged to the political section of the Tehran-based 'Spy Den of America'.

In the meantime, part of the documents produced and later shredded and/or pulverized by the embassy-based C. I. A. Station at Tehran was also reconstructed to complement the previously published collection while clearly demonstrating America's operational and intelligence support in strengthening the moderation-trend. These documents are presented in two volumes to the Revolutionary Ummah of Iran in particular, and the people of the world in general as another proof of our nation's righteous campaign in isolating the political currents dependent on foreign powers. The first volume consists of the documents concerning Shariat Madari, while the second volume concerns notorious persons like Amir Entizam, Bahramiyan, Muqaddam Maraghi, Hasan Nazih, Khusrow Qashqai, and some unknown persons like Turaj Nasiri and Ali Sayfpur Fatimi.

The present collection exposes elements and currents that act in the name of independence, democracy, human rights and even religion in furthuring colonial and exploitative causes of foreign supporters versus the deprived nations. The ducuments expose those parties and persons who, though being born of our own soil and fed by its resources, "despite the shattering of the myth of America's invincibility at the hands of Iranian people, seek advice from the U. S. A. in matters concerning the destiny of this country and its people". Although our country and our people have defeated U. S. A. in this land, they have not given up their connections with America. "Where should this complaint be registered?". Those groups and persons in lieu of the assurance of political support, monthly salaries and individual and political power, or rather in their love for America, consciously or unconsciously committed themselves to destroy a system that raised the banner of Islam, independence and freedom as against the widespread infidelity on earth. This group is comprised of, pseudo-holymen whose ambitions have made them ignorant of God, the pseudo-populars who voice the imperialist brand of nationalism, the nationalist muslims that are culturally western-oriented, and monarchists known for their disgrace throughout the world.

But, "It is difficult for muslims to co-operate with those pseudo-

holymen, who pretend to be loyal to Islam but are trying to undermine it. They pose a problem whose solution is hard to be found... It was obvious that Howayda (ex-Shah's premier) was the enemy of Islam and the muslims, what Nasiri (ex-SAVAK head) had done against the people was clear and the latter's obligation towards him obvious... But what are we to do with the so-called holyman who has a roasary in his hands and makes repeated claims of serving Islam?". (A speech by the Imam: 24/9/58 Iranian Calendar Year).

These pseudo-popular individuals had no assignement other than undermining the revolution from within and burrying it in itself by sowing the seeds of discord and disunity... Thereby bringing about problems of the past... A handful of hoodlums, a handful of persons unaware of God, a handful of blokes in whose houses shameful things were discovered -- these and the likes of them -- have stood up against all the Muslims to support Carter and the likes of him. (A speech by the Imam: 19/9/58).

The story of the third contingent is the story of the fellows who were born and brought up during the fifty year reign of despostism and debauchery in our land, and who thought and acted within the ideological framework, which was propagated in the country by the great Satan.

> (This is) the story of this man whose business has become known now. It is a matter of deep regret that even now these praise them, for their brains had been turned upside down. A person who was trained by them for fifty years, whose mind was made devoid of any sense of human dignity, received as a substitute a brain manufactured in the West. Howsoever great are the blows inflicted by the West upon his country and his people, even then such a person is all-admiration for the West, and makes all efforts necessary for their return... (A speech by the Imam: 21/9/58 Shamsi).

The line of the moderates, is that of alliance with infidels (knowingly or to the contrary), mobilized against the most decent of all men, human-beings that are to the best of their abilities, determined to establish the rule of the Quranic Laws, the traditions of the Prophet (S. A. W.) and the infallible Imams (A. S.). The example of the followers of the moderate line is the example of Abu Sufyan and persons like him, who were united in a bid to prevent the Prophet (S. A. W.) from forming a government, for they were afraid of Islam, which threatended their vested interests. These people, who are opposing Islam at present, are afraid of it due to their own interests and the interests of their masters for which they are serving foreigners. Likes of these people (in the past) were better than the present ones, for at least they did not serve others, but revolted against Islam to safeguard their own interests. These persons have risen for foreigners, and act on their behalf in order to paralyse the movement, launched by you -- the men of God. (A speech by the Imam: 39/9/58).

In the following pages we shall try to present, on the basis of the documents, the views of the U. S. A. and those known as the followers of the moderate line concerning the Islamic Revolution, and how it is to be confronted.

The influence and infiltration of the U. S. A. in all corners of our country and the growth of the middle class in Iran gave rise to the illusion in the minds of the U. S. A. functionaries that, religion, as a revolutionary force, had become quite weak. They were under the impression that discontent with the regime of the Shah might be possibly due to the movements of the left and the rightist nationalism, inspired by the West, irrespective of their religious or secular colour. Of course, it does not mean that U. S. A. totally ignored the realities of the Iranian society and completely eliminated the perimeter of religion. It only means that the importance which was attached by the U. S. A. to the political currents of the left and the right was not attached to the religious movements. With this impression the U. S. A. studied and evaluated the nature of the anti-Shah opposition movements. In these studies, besides the two major goals of estimating the extent of discontent with the Shah and the imperial regime, and the channelization of those currents into support for the Shah, there was also a third objective, namely an identification of factions, organizations, policies and the structural make up of the opposition, in order to hire and train suitable elements that could be used in the formation of a regime supportive of U. S. interesets when the Shah was confronted with serious threats. (However, it is not to be overlooked that these individuals and parties because of their very nature, willingly or unwillingly, were fed from the manager of imperialism). In this respect the U. S. A. got hold of all opportunities to achieve the above-mentioned objectives.

The uprising of the Fifteenth of Khurdad (June 5, 1962), was a warning to the U. S. A. to revise its estimation of the forces of the opposition (to the Shah). With due consideration of this uprising and the role of the aware and mujaheed, Shi'ite clergymen, and the amount of popular support for them, the U. S. A. discovered to its amazement that religion and the clerics were still unique and effective factors in mobilizing the masses against the Shah and his despotism. As a consequence, the U. S. A. chalked out a plan aimed at indentifying and recruting certain elements from amongst the clergymen, and possibly, influence or groom from among them a personage recognized as the marja (the highest religious authority among the Shi'ite) thereby exploiting this great pillar of Shi'ism to serve its own interests. Accordingly the operational requirements of the SAVAK and C. I. A. and their collaboration in putting their plans, into effect led them to an individual named Sayyid Kazem Shariat Madari.

The viewpoint of Shariat Madari and his fellow-travellers concerning the U. S. A. issued from their belief that the absence of the U. S. A. from Iran was synonymous with the disappearance of the independence of this country. Their reason for seeking refuge in the devilish embrace of U. S. A. was that the American scarecrow could be used as a weapon against the paganism of communism and the U. S. S. R. This belief was sufficient for the U. S. A. to open an account in their favour.

Anyhow Shariat Madari untill the Revolution, continued his balloon-like rise in the exalted garb of a religious authority under the explicit patronage of the SAVAK and the implicit support of the C. I. A., so that whenever a need arose he could serve to guard the interests of imperialism.

Despite all efforts, through moderate elements, in preventing the fall of the Shah and the overthrow of the imperial regime, from the national reconciliation government and the premiership of Bakhtiar, to the pacifying announcements and the covert support for the military by the pseudo-clerics, the U. S. lost all resistence before the volcanic eruption and the magnitude of the revolution, because it could neither analyze it nor confront it. Finally, that is when the Islamic Revolution promised independence, freedom and the Islamic Republic in its victory.

The main causes of America's failure to fight the Islamic Revolution were: firstly, its over confidence in the Shah's regime and its agents within the regime combined with its hopeless faith in stabilizing the monarchical system; secondly, its wrong perception of the Iranian reality due to which it equated the nationalist and the sincratic tendencies with the religious movement. On the basis of the attention it had concentrated on the former elements and the commitments of their leadership, America thought it could stall the emergence of a regime which threatened its vested interests.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the realization of the relative importance of the effective elements in this victory, America tried to utilize the same channels, with whose members it was in contact, to form a government, which could, despite outward differences with Pahlavi regime, serve the purpose of maintaining Iran as the good market it was for its military and consumer industries, as the good base it was for its espionage activities, and finally as the good and secure source it was, in supplying the energy needed by American industries. For this purpose it made an attempt to make use of its own active agents which were at the head of the moderate tendencies.

At this juncture, besides the objectives of America against the Islamic Revolution, the aims and goals of the moderate groups come also into focus. Due to the fast growth, stormy speed and effective techniques employed by the forces of the Islamic Revolution to counter the imperialist rule, these groups also, like their masters, were not able to analyze fully and comprehensively the course of events. They had to follow in an opportunist fashion the line of the revolutionary leaders and the people unwillingly in order to hide their faces, and seized upon occasional opportunities in doing so. The revolution's speedy onward move and these elements' pseudo-popularity were major factors in concealing their real nature, but due to the righteousness of the Islamic revolution and the incompatibility of truth and falsehood their filthy roles were gradually exposed.

The characteristic traits of opportunism, attempt to secure individual benefits and inability to comprehend the situation at the early stages

of the Revolution prevented these elements from taking a united stand against the Islamic Revolution. A group of them which had occupied sensitive positions and had access to possibilities for materializing its ideals, and another group hoping to occupy positions in order to be able to impose its ideas, still refrained from expressing their heart-felt opinions. But the incompatibility of their intentions with those of the nation which meant to establish the rule of Islam and was demonstrated by the formation of the Assembly of Experts, the writing down of the constitution and the implemention of Islamic precepts, led to the exposure of their real ugly faces. One group began to openly fight the Islamic Revolution, another began to undermine the Revolutionary inspirations by means placed at their disposal by the revolution itself, while some elements set upon building political organizations in a bid to pave the way for the fall of the Islamic Revolution, and expand ties with America as the major topic of their programs.

C. I. A. 's efforts in the meantime, were directed at preparing a comprehensive analytical report on the Iranian situation, determining a policy on the basis of the prepared analysis, and the implementation method for the policy. Through its agents in the army, ministries and offices and throughout individuals engaged in commercial activities, the C. I. A. gave complete priority to information-collection on all internal trends and required issues of interest, then, as summerized below, put forth the policy and its implementation method:

1- The policy of the C. I. A. vis-a-vis the Islamic Revolution:

At the level of the government and with regard to the elements that were effective in Iran the U. S. A. found itself facing two different forces: first, the leadership of the Revolution and its followers and supporters; second, a wide spectrum of moderates, each of whom was directed by a different authority or was able to exercise its power effectively. The Imam's unwavering resolution to enforce the Islamic laws and establish the Sovereignty of the Quran in the society and to combat uncompromisingly all the phenomena of infidelity, right from the West up to East and their agents, forced the U. S. A. to realize that the implementation of the Imam's policy meant a fatal death-blow to the hopes of imperialism, which was trying to revive its hold on the resources of the country. America decided to fight this policy by making use of all its agents for destroying and overthrowing the Islamic Republic. Due to the loss of its active and efficient agents, America's first aim was to cultivate, bring up and install a force loyal to it, which could also have military power (The U. S. A. was mistaken because there were no such elements in the army). In this period, with the purpose of realizing the desired objective America as a first step sought to form and direct a coalition consisting of all the potential heads of various political liberal groups, the moderate religious personalities, the army officers inclined towards the West, the chiefs of tribes and different national groups for getting hold of the Provisional Government, so that ground was prepared to launch the actual programme. Naturally, in case this programme was implemented, the elements instrumental in its realization were not to be set aside, but were to be used

for promoting the policies and interests of the regime. The reason why the U. S. A. was not contented to bring to power the moderate elements was that it was forced to submit to the pressures brought about by the Imam's policy. Anyhow, America wished to install a regime that could be fully at its command. At the same time the U. S. A. lost no time in making use of all anti-revolutionary elements including the SAVAK men, Bakhtiyar, the monarchists and all those factions that openly opposed the Islamic Revolution from its very inception. As in this collection we want to devote especial attention to the moderates, we refrain from making further reference to other groups. The documents concerning them have been published in the book No.38 of this series.

2- Application of the policy line:

According to the C. I. A. 's resolution to pursue the formation of a coalition of the liberal politicians, the moderate clerics and all other moderate elements, it was, however, decided that it was shariat Madari who could help accelerate this process. The reason to select Shariat Madari as the axis of this alliance was that he possessed the qualifications of a religious authority as a marja, and in that capacity due to his credibility among the Muslim masses he could appeal them and that his personality could be instrumental in making such a coalition work. The C. I. A. did not intend to form such a coalition through merging together different constituent groups and individuals, but wished to use each of them as a separate channel for reaching the primary target of its programme. For instance, it wanted to bring out a daily paper by means or Khusrow Qashqai and Madani with the purpose of paving the ground for the desired cultural and propaganda activities; through the liberation movement (Nahzat-e Azadi) and the Provisional Government, efforts could be made to nullify and invalidate the political resolutions that would be made on the basis of the policy of the Imam; with the help of the Muslim People's Party and the leadership of Shariat Madari it aimed at starting a newspaper for giving a religious colour by his political presence to such a coalition. These programmes were duely approved by the C. I. A. Apart from solving the formal differences of various groups, this programme proved to be effective in pursuing and directing the desired policy (formation of a coalition), and served as a factor in co-ordinating them (the desired contacts between the National Front, Khusrow Qashqai etc. and Shariat Madari, as exposed by the documents, provide us an account of the first steps taken to attain this objective).

The results obtained by the C. I. A. in its efforts to realize its objectives are fully made explicit in the following documents. At the end the names of those elements are enumerated who were either members of the C. I. A. or somehow provided the C. I. A. with necessary information. The documents themselves speak volumes of their treachery and shamelessness.

The Liberation Movement:

Bahram Bahramiyan: a member of the high command of the liberation movement received salary from the C. I. A. since 1356 (1977)

Abbas Amir Intizam: an eminent leader of the Liberation Movement a C. I. A. agent from the beginning of the fifth decade of the Shamsi calender (In a document included in this collection a C. I. A. officer, George tells the director of the C. I. A. that Amir Intizam helped him in the beginning of 1349. (1970); worked as a contact between the C. I. A. and the Bazargan government for the exchange of information.

The Nationalist Groups:

Sam Sanjabi: He was in contact with the C. I. A. at San Fransisco. By virtue of being the son of Karim Sanjabi his services were used by the C. I. A. to remain in contact with the leadership of the Nationalist front.

Khusrow Qashqai: An agent of the C. I. A. with a long record of service; his motive in co-operating with the C. I. A. was to secure assurance of financial and political support (by the C. I. A.) for pursuing its objectives vis-a-vis the Islamic Republic.

Rahmatullah Muqaddam Maraghi: a C. I. A. agent since 1349 (1970), a very old and intimate friend of the C. I. A. station at Tehran.

Hasan Nazih: a C. I. A. agent (whose record of relations with the C. I. A. goes back to the pre-revolution days).

For having full information regarding the C. I. A. connection of the moderate religious elements under the leadership of Shariat Madari refer to the documents concerning the latter.

Muslim Students, following
the Line of the Imam.

Autumn, 1364/1985.

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE
MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE

CABLES AND REPORTS NO. TEHRAN 53.59, TEHRAN 54050, TEHRAN 54167, INTELLIGENCE REPORT TITLED "COMMENTS OF MOQADDAM-MARAGHEH ON .....", TEHRAN 43996, INTELLIGENCE REPORT TITLED "EFFORT BY GROUP INCLUDING AYATOLLAH .....", INTELLIGENCE REPORT TITLED "POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND .....", INTELLIGENCE REPORT TITLED "MILITARY AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL .....", TEHRAN 53879 WERE THE LAST COPIES OF THEIR ORIGINAL TEXTS AND THUS, VERY DULL IN COLOR; THEREFORE, THEIR IN-BOOKS PRINTING AND PHOTOGRAPHING WERE NOT FAVORABLY POSSIBLE. FOR THIS REASON, THE ABOVE-MENTIONED DOCUMENTS WERE RE-TYPED.

The persons mentioned below contacted Shariat Madari on behalf of the U. S. embassy and the C. I. A. or had passed reports (about him):

1. Frank Baruz

Occupation: The chairman of the Iran-American Chamber of Commerce.

Following a meeting with Shariat Madari, Baruz reported to embassy that Shariat Madari told him that as he could not receive confirmed information, he felt that he was not prepared to deal with the present situation. The Charge d'Affairs took this statement of Shariat Madari as an implicit invitation to the U. S. administration for supplying him with the desired news and information to enable him to participate in the course of events.

The C. I. A. headquarters, as a result of these reports, asked the U. S. administration to provide the needed information to Shariat Madari and work for establishing the proper channels in order to supply the information.

At the beginning they had decided to ask Baruz, provided he too agreed, to tell Shariat Madari to pinpoint an intermediary of his confidence (with English as his second language) and receive informations through him, so that Baruz could give an end to his role after having prepared the preliminaries.

Baruz was of the view that the embassy should encourage Shariat Madari's moderate views, so that he might have confidence that he enjoyed the approval of the U. S. government with regard to his faith in "the necessity of retaining the foreign trade-relations of Iran". In Shariat Madari's support, Baruz visualized the best prospects of carrying on trade with Iran.

In view of the limitation of his vision regarding Shariat Madari, which covered only a minor portion of its goal, the C. I. A. demanded that these contacts should remain within the confines of the activities of the embassy, and ruled out the possibilities of cooperating with Baruz and discarded him without considering him as a potential channel.

2. Real Name: Not known.

Code Name: S. D. Valid.

Occupation: Probably he was a businessman and owned some estate and property. He was one of the permanent spies of the C. I. A. in the oil business, and was in contact with the leaders of the anti-revolutionary organizations, including Forouhar and Ali Islami among the leaders of the Muslim Peoples Party and some of the fugitive chiefs of the Torkaman tribes of the Mazandaran province, and Khuzistan, and was active in making effective use of the

spying devices (advancing these activities by means of telecommunication links - receiving long-distance radio messages - which were installed for the U. S. government secretly, a mention of which is made in the document of Aban 7, 1358 (October 29, 1979), in the context of the same spy).

After knowing the views of Baruz, it was decided that S. D. Valid, who had to go to Qum on the occasion of the death anniversary of his father, would contact Shariat Madari. The main purpose of this meeting was to know the views and reactions of Shariat Madari through the tenor of his speech and the kind of reception he accorded to Valid, in order to decide the usefulness of Valid's services in the future.

In Ordibehesht (April) Valid met Shariat Madari in Qum and informed him that he had brought a goodwill message from Shariat Madari's Iranian and American friends and well-wishers in America for him. Shariat Madari was very happy to receive this message through Valid. After some conversation and explaining his position, Shariat Madari reiterated his invitation to Valid by saying, 'come once, come twice, come as many times as you wish to', and the meeting concluded. After this visit of Valid, the C. I. A. reached the conclusion that Valid's report completely corresponded with earlier reports saying that Shariat Madari was possibly interested in establishing a common channel with America.

On Ordibehesht 31 (May 21) the station decided to send Valid to Qum for ascertaining the position of Shariat Madari regarding his desire to establish (intelligence) contacts with the C. I. A.. This meeting took place on the morning of Khurdad 5 (June 26). Valid was surprised to see the eagerness and warmth with which he was received. After conveying to him the regards of the American friends and saying that they knew what role he could play in the political arena of Iran, Valid asked him that in view of the desire of his American friends he should propose the name of a person with whom they might discuss these matters. Shariat Madari told him that his political party was in need of help and he asked Valid to talk to the leaders of the party and join it. Valid told him that he also had an intention of joining the party but proposed that these contacts should better be formed through a person in whom he had complete trust and that he should be sure that these matters would be kept secret. Shariat Madari gave him the name of his son Hassan, and asked him to take to Hassan whomsoever he wanted. During his visit to the station, Valid told them that Shariat Madari knew very well what sort of relationship was going to be formed and that the American friends were no other than the U. S. government.

After that Valid went to Hassan and told him what had happened between his father and himself. During this meeting Hassan gave him his Tehran address and telephone number, and asked him to contact him along with or without the friends whenever he liked. The acting chief of the Tehran Station, Glegoroff, asked Valid to meet Hassan, but at

the same time to make some excuses, so that the swiftness of the events could be slowed for a while. In the meantime, it was also decided that Valid should join the Muslim Peoples' Party. The C. I. A. remarked that Valid had performed a great task and had established an independent and an apparently extremely confidential channel with Shariat Madari for the C. I. A.

On Khurdad 20 (June 10), Glegoroff met Hassan in the capacity of a diplomat related to the U. S. Embassy. Valid introduced them to each other and acted as an interpretor. In the meantime, it was decided that another meeting between Hassan and Valid would be arranged on Khurdad 22 (June 12) to decide the future course of action by America in this regard.

No other documents are available in connection with this meeting and the steps taken by Valid in the matter of Shariat Madari. Only one document is present in this section, according to which Valid, after he had met the eminent members of the Torkaman tribes of Gunabad region, reported to the U. S. Embassy that these tribes had an intention of launching an armed struggle, but Shariat Madari sent them word, not to start the armed resistence yet.

The point is worthy of being mentioned here that other members of the C. I. A., who were participating in the Shariat Madari drama, did not possess any knowledge of the remaining channels and links.

3. Real Name: Brigadier General Farazian.

Code Name: S. D. Janus/13.

Occupation: A high ranking officer of the Savak.

4. Real Name: Murtaza Musavi.

Occupation: Director and manager of Piranco Ltd.

Before the Revolution, Farazian had official contacts with the C. I. A. Station, and after the Revolution he retained these contacts through his occassional visits and telephone calls. During one of his early visits, after the Revolution, he introduced Musavi to one of the officials of the station, as a tradesman who had relations with Shariat Madari.

In the document dated Ordibehesht 29 (May 10), the C. I. A. has made a reference to the problem concerning Baruz and Valid in the matters of Shariat Madari, and has made an assessment of the actions taken by Farazian, in response to the desire expressed by Shariat Madari for the formation of contacts with the U. S. Government, and it is said that this was done by one of the subordinates of Shariat Madari.

Following the decision of the C. I. A. for the formation of a secure and safe channel with Shariat Madari and about certain other matters

which have been mentioned earlier, Farazian was also considered as a possible channel. But after reviewing the danger of passing the reports through an ex-SAVAK officer (Farazian) and his relationship with Shariat Madari in view of the sensitivity of the society towards the relationship between Shariat Madari and an ex-SAVAK official and the possibility of being betrayed any time, the C. I. A. was right in rejecting Farazian.

In order to make a decision on the establishment of contacts with Shariat Madari, it was necessary for the C. I. A. to have sufficient information about all quarters of Iran with the potential and actual participation of Shariat Madari in these affairs in order to support him as someone who could be useful for them in the future and who could protect American interests in Iran. Shariat Madari's political party (the Muslim Peoples' Party) became the object of the C. I. A. 's attention as a sure way of reaching the desired goals and a means of obtaining information. Farazian was again estimated by them as a useful person for the purpose of maintaining contacts and collecting information from this party.

For the sake of fulfilling his own individual and political ambitions, and in his desire for gaining Shariat Madari's support for the U. S. Farazian pursued his aims of becoming the chief of the future set up that was to be constituted under Shariat Madari's rule. He promptly made arrangements for the meeting between the C. I. A. and Shariat Madari and other like-minded persons, and in order to felicitate the task and clear the way for making contants with Shariat Madari and his associates, he chose Musavi, who had the same views as himself, and like himself was an ardent supporter of Shariat Madari.

During a telephone conversation with Farazian and in a note that he sent to the officials at the Tehran Station through Musavi, Musavi stated that the funds should be collected from the wealthy officers of the SAVAK who had fled to other countries. Musavi and Farazian, both of them believed that Shariat Madari should welcome their support, provided that an active and absolutely safe channel was established. He also believed that Shariat Madari would also agree to a direct meeting.

On Ordibehesht 31 (May 21), the C. I. A. gave the approval to gather information about the Muslim Peoples' Party via Farazian and asked Farazian to ascertain whether Shairat Madari would give permission for the establishment of such a channel. During the meeting on Khurdad 7 (May 28), with the officials of the C. I. A. Farazian told them that he had made contacts with the leaders of the Muslim Peoples' Party for the second time, and they had approved the idea of working with the Americans, and added that, in case of their approval, a group of selected members of the Muslim Peoples' Party would visit Qum to discuss the matters with Shariat Madari in order to secure his approval or disapproval. Farazian further added that the supporters of Shariat Madari maintained that they were in need of economic and political assistance since they were attempting to send their representatives to the Majlis.

Glegoroff (a C. I. A. station officers) says that before launching any operations, it is necessary to obtain some fully reliable information, then calls on Farazian to collect informations on election, and the quality of the forces.

According to a report, on Khurdad 16th (June 6) C. I. A. headquarters informs the Tehran-based station that because of Shariat Madari's inclination towards the establishment of contact through his son, it has come to conclude that they are acting in a quicker-than-necessary-a-pace with regards to the political future of Iran. Besides, we are making our reserve forces capable of losing control over the situation, forces who despite sharing the same interests with us, might have different outlooks on how these interests could be better protected and accomplished. In this vein, the C. I. A. station in Tehran is held responsible for Farazian, arguing that it is better not to use him as a channel of contact for Shariat Madari and instead retain him as reserve reporting source on the political scene and the intelligence organization, because as a political channel he can grow more dangerous.

During his telephone conversation on Khurdad 17 (June 7) Farazian told Glegoroff that Musavi had gone to Qum and visited Shariat Madari, and Shariat Madari had completely agreed with the recommendations of Musavi and other leaders of the (M. P. P.) Muslim Peoples' Party saying that for exploring the chances of gaining support from the U. S. government, contacts should be made with the latter. After expressing his approval, which was conditional upon two things, Shariat Madari said that he promised that in return for the money that was to be paid to him he was ready to do everything that the U. S. government asked him to do. Shariat Madari asked Musavi to convince the Americans that the sum of $5 million (the same amount that was reported by Farazian to the C. I. A.) would suffice for the purposes of... the actual expenditure required would be several times more than this amount. In the end of the conversation, Farazian emphatically told him that Shariat Madari wanted to get a decisive answer as to whether the U. S. government would support him or not, and Glegoroff tried to explain to him that such important decisions were usually taken after long deliberations and extended co-operation.

During another telephone conversation with Farazian on Khurdad 19 (June 9), Glegoroff remained firm on his earlier stand of delaying the economic assistance to Shariat Madari untill getting complete information, and emphasized the need for perfect understanding. But he agreed to supply him with the information. Farazian expressed his displeasure at this, and told him that Shariat Madari's aims were quite clear, and that there was no need to waste more time in making further estimations, and that Shariat Madari needed money for winning more followers, so that those funds might be distributed among deserving persons and their loyalties be assured. He said that these funds would be utilized to meet the additional expenses of the party. In the end, Farazian told him that it would be beneficial for them if Shariat Madari entered the field with... enough... to fight against Khomeini. It was decided that Farazian would inform Musavi about the C. I. A. decision.

On Tir 25 (July 15) Musavi and Farazian had a meeting with Ahern (the C. I. A. director of the Tehran station) for two hours. During this meeting they insisted that a C. I. A. official should talk directly to Shariat Madari. Regarding the question asked by the director of the station at Tehran as to how the funds would be utilized, Musavi answered that although in the beginning, when he asked for money, Shariat Madari had thought of using it for purchasing arms for equipping the Azarbaijanians living in Tehran but 'now', he said 'the situation is a little changed'.

The meeting which took place between Ahern and Farazian and Musavi in Murdad (August), suggests the following:

Farazian again spoke about the formation of direct contact with Shariat Madari, and the C. I. A. official said that the headquarters was aware of the benefits of direct contacts but Charge d'Affairs found it difficult to find some body whose associations with the SAVAK might not hinder this contact. Farazian remarked that the C. I. A. could contact Ayatullah Zanjani, as Zanjani was the counterpart of the personality of Shariat Madari. He added that though Zanjani could not speak English, his son Farid, who was at that time in Tehran, could be used as an interpreter.

During the contacts and meetings that followed the visit of Murdad (August) and the proposal made about Zanjani, the C. I. A., Musavi and Farazian were making plans for arranging a meeting with Zanjani. During the meeting on Mehr 22 (October 14), Farazian said that Musavi had gone to Qum according to their programme, and had obtained Shariat Madari's consent for the meeting with Zanjani. He had also conveyed this message to Zanjani.

Real Name: Manuchehr Neikpur.

Code Name: S. D. Bip.

According to his own claims, this person had an old relationship with Shariat Madari by virtue of the high position of his family and their financial resources. His last personal meeting with Shariat Madari had taken place in the year 57 (1978), details of which appeared in the newspapers of Ordibehesht 18 (May 2). During his conversation of Shahriwar 20 (September 11) with the officer in-charge of the base in Philadelphia, Neikpur informed him about one Ali Akbar Shahla, who owned a small company which dealt in imported glass ware. Neikpur told him that that person was from the upper class and enjoyed Shariat Madari's confidence. He added that while he was in Iran he used to regularly visit Shariat Madari every week. Neikpur told the C. I. A. official that he was ready to arrange a meeting with Shahla. The C. I. A. headquarters asked the Philadelphia base not to do anything towards making contacts with the friend of Neikpur, but wished to acquire knowledge through him about Shariat Madari.

As it has been mentioned in the section concerning the Farazian

and Musavi connection with the C. I. A., the C. I. A. could make contacts with Ayatullah Zanjani as Shariat Madari's counterpart. In the wake of this incident the C. I. A. made efforts first to obtain his records, and then to prepare an intelligence report about the nature and extent of the relationship between the two.

After receiving several reports and coming to know the relevant views, the C. I. A. headquarters sent a message to the Tehran station stating that the contents of the file did not verify the report of a close relationship between Zanjani and Shariat Madari, but it did not rule out its possibility either, and it agreed to establish contacts with Zanjani for the sake of gathering information about Shariat Madari and the Muslim Peoples' Party through his source.

In pursuance of the request made by the station to the headquarters for receiving the records concerning Zanjani and his son Muhammad Saeed Farid Zanjani, which were relevant to the course under consideration, were sent.

Ayatullah Haj Agha Reza Zanjani, popularly known as Reza Zanjani and famous as Mulla Sayyed Reza Zanjani, whose file number was 6054 (?)-01 and whose code identity was 'A' (the document bearing the code name of Zanjani could not be traced), was an old and intimate friend of S. D. Rup/1, the source at Tehran (an ex-army commander), who was responsible for the activities of the station. Zanjani had wide contacts throughout Iran among political dissidents and well known persons, who were not members of any organization and who included the leaders of the bazar who were positively opposed to the government... And after this, there are references to Farid's past record.

In one of the documents, Farazian told the official at the Tehran station that Saeed Farid, the son of Ayatullah Zanjani, in case he was found to be ready and capable of doing the job, might be considered to be used as the person responsible for keeping a watch on Shariat Madari's financial as well as public relations affairs. In another meeting, Musavi and Farazian, after suggesting a meeting with Zanjani, recommended Farid's name as an interpreter. Farid's records were asked to be presented for perusal.

America and the Moderates:

After reviewing the documents concerning the agents and spies in contact with the activities of Shariat Madari, it seems necessary to describe the American view and its aims regarding this issue. In one of the documents the director of the C. I. A. base in Tehran elaborates his programme of action in the following words:

"I wish to express my views that since the army is undergoing a period of weakness it is not possible for us to make any attempt in connection with our work at this stage. What is to be done, and what we are pursuing at present, is meant to introduce and explain our proposed

coalition that can be constituted by the political liberals, the moderate spiritual personalities and the officers of the army with the western inclination, and to secure their support in this matter. The person who more than others can accelerate the formation of this coalition is Ayatullah Shariat Madari".

In the beginning of the C. I. A. contact with Shariat Madari, the director of the base, in one of the later documents, after pointing out that the door of securing the support of Shariat Madari and his party is open, says that the main objective in this matter, as Khomeini alleges, will be to create disruption in the Islamic Movement and to weaken it so that men of ideas can assert themselves in a more reasonable way. In response to this suggestion of its base the C. I. A. headquarters proposes a correction of the view by pointing out that mere disruption is not enough, but it is to be aimed at forming a pro-American government. It is said: 'The objective of our political activity is to bring to power a government that agrees to protect the interests of the U. S. A. For our acceptance of Shariat Madari's party as one of the means of attaining this objective it is essential to determine the extent of his power and influence. For the purpose of bringing about such a government which could help in expanding the American influence it was necessary to bring to power the moderate forces existing in the society. With the view that for the installation of such a government a military force was an essential pre-requisite, the C. I. A. gave top priority to the formation of some kind of dependable organizations that included army personnel and armed groups which were of the same view. This step was considered to be essential in realizing the ultimate ends of the U. S. A. The headquarters seeks from its Tehran base a clarification regarding the support of the armed groups and an estimation of their leanings towards the moves made by Shariat Madari. Of course, before materializing the efforts of forming such organizations, strenthening the foundations of a moderate government was considered to be necessary for securing the support of the masses and having a popular base among them. The C. I. A. issued the following directive in this connection:

"The best way of reaching the target of installing a moderate government enjoying the people's support would be that it should be under the leadership of either a spiritual head or a spiritual society that ought to be powerful enough for maintaining law and order".

America and Shariat Madari:

Keeping in view the general strategy of America and the C. I. A. vis-a-vis the Islamic Revolution, the C. I. A. sought to execute its tactics while maintaining the maximum care for the security and intelligence sides of its strategy plan.

After the meeting between Baruz and Shariat Madari and his inability to give confirmed information about the situation, it was treated by the government of America as another invitation of co-operation

on his behalf. In addition to this, the demonstrations in Tabriz protesting against the article published in the Daily Ittila'at regarding the Muslim People's Democratic Party were mistakenly compared with the demonstrations against the article in the Daily Kayhan concerning the Imam in the month of Mehr 1356 (October 1977), and were regarded as a measure of Shariat Madari's increasing popularity. The most important of all, the general strategy of America, which has been expounded earlier, compelled the C. I. A. to execute its plan in this matter. In the first place, the C. I. A. station strongly recommended Shariat Madari's request for getting relevant information from the American government and took the necessary steps for conveying such information to him.

After the preliminary steps were taken, some of the C. I. A. agents brought the reports of Shariat Madari's desire for establishing stronger and wider bilateral relations including his request for having money at his disposal to initiate the functioning of organizations that could operate as a politico-military force all over the country. The C. I. A. came face to face with the main problems, which it had to resolve. The problems may be delineated as follows:

1- Need to be fully satisfied that the reported moves and gestures made on behalf of Shariat Madari were the same as the sources reported. (This matter was resolved to some extent through different channels established with Shariat Madari).

2- The difficulties concerning direct contact with him and in taking steps to find out a middleman that could indirectly convey their views to Shariat Madari and his group to the C. I. A. (Hassan Shariat Madari is introduced by his father to Valid so that he is introduced to the C. I. A. (the American friends). The name of Ayatullah Zanjani is also suggested to the C. I. A. by Musavi and Farazian in this connection. As far as the documents indicate, the preliminary steps of establishing contact and receiving information in this matter had been taken).

3- The steps to be taken for spreading a network of political and even military bases which were to support Shariat Madari, so that through its special characteristics the Muslim People's Party could attract the full attention of America. (Valid's membership in this party and the close relation of Musavi and Farazian with the leaders of this party were the steps for realizing this end).

4- In the event that successful results were attained in the different aspects mentioned above and summing up all of the information gained at the prior stages, the problems of co-ordination and programming for placing all the possible means at the disposal of Shariat Madari and his group by America for the purpose of overthrowing the Islamic Republic of Iran was to be solved. (That America turned down the unambiguous request of its sources to grant financial aid to Shariat Madari was because of two reasons: firstly, the preliminary steps had not been completed by them; secondly, it required some time to fully

and comprehensively investigate the general conditions in Iran and the fabrics of the opposition groups. The need for marking time, of course, does not mean that the U. S. A. had postponed its proposed steps. The documents reveal that simultaneous with these plans concerning Shariat Madari the C. I. A. continued to explore the possibilities of realizing its objectives through Khusrow Qashqai and Maraghei etc.

Shariat Madari:

The Past Record:

In the books about the moderates, the material concerning Shariat Madari's relations with the SAVAK and the Shah's court has been published. A document dated Ordibehesht (May 8), has recorded these relations so far as they were in the knowledge of America. There are several reports belonging to the year 1345 (1966) which tell us that Shariat Madari had comparatively good relations, and his name has been on the list of the salaried persons working for the SAVAK. As an evidence of the last claim, in a report dated Aban 1350 (November 1971) he is mentioned as the head of a religious centre at Qum drawing salaries from the Prime Ministry and the SAVAK. In another report dated 1357 (1978), Shariat Madari is mentioned as one of the most eminent clerics cooperating with the SAVAK to form a religious organization. In another one it is reported in the year 1357 (1978) that he is an eminent religious personality who through the SAVAK... will be...

The Views and Activities:

Taking note of such a record, Shariat Madari's views regarding the Imam and the Islamic Republic are easy to be identified. Shariat Madari, in response to Valid's request concerning the American friends' eagerness to know his position with regard to the existing problems, says that they should read the text of his telegram to Shaykh Muhammad Khaqani, sent in the beginning of Ordibehesht (May), that is the period when Shaykh Muhammad warned him that if the activities of the committee of that region were not put under his control he would leave Iran. Undoubtedly this message was sent to him during the days when the Imam and Ayatullah Taleghani wanted him not to leave Iran. This period coincides with his intention of visiting Qum for holding discussions. Shariat Madari advised him not to leave Abadan, even for a visit to Qum, for the affairs of the state needed him to be in Abadan. (There is no doubt that by this advice, Shariat Madari wanted to create another zone of trouble for the Islamic Republic with the purpose of staging a confrontation with the Imam in Khuzistan). His posture vis-a-vis the position of the Imam and the Islamic Republic in other matters was grounded in his theoritical and practical ambition of replacing the Imam as a force and bringing about a system and a political current which could serve to satisfy his lust for political power and his personal interests. This was not possible except by bringing to power the pro-American groups and the functionaries of the ex-regime, a majority of whom were the agents of the C. I. A., the SAVAK and the supporters of the monarchy

and friends of America. He himself, on the basis of these views, took steps to establish contacts with the C. I. A. with the full knowledge of the kinds of persons whom he was contacting, he expressed his liking for those connections and made requests to receive money from them.

Shariat Madari, after arranging a few meetings with the C. I. A. agents, made his intention precisely known to them, that his motive was not confined to receiving informations and reports from America only. (Shariat Madari's purpose for securing information regarding the then current affairs in Iran was to adopt a correct attitude towards America. He was anxious not to take a position that was not in conformity with the American view of Iran). He made a request through Musavi for the money, for in the beginning he wanted to use it for arming the people of Azarbaijan, living in Tehran, so that through them he could translate his objective into action whenever a favourable situation arose. Afterwards, in his own words, when he had a better perception of the problems, he resolved to make use of this money for the formation of a country-wide organization in Iran. He even sought help from the American elements in the planning and integrating the organizational activities of the Muslim Peoples' Party. With attention to the risks involved in such connections, Shariat Madari requested to keep them strictly secret for the sake of the security of the concerned parties. This is itself an indication of his exact awareness of what he wanted to do and what kind of connections he pursued.

In the sphere of the coordination of anti-revolutionary united front and the actualization of the provisional American strategy for making effective the activities of the moderates, either under the leadership, or with the support of moderate clerics, Shariat Madari saw to it that preliminary contacts were established, a policy of cooperation with the National Front, Muqadam, Naziyeh and Khusrow Qashai was implemented, and the necessary steps were taken for this purpose.

23 Oct 79

S E C R E T 222006Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 537156.

TO: TEHRAN.

WNINTEL

REFS: A. TEHRAN 53910
B. TEHRAN 54454
C. TEHRAN 54513

1. REGRET DELAY RESPONDIMG.

2. LWSURF IS INDICATOR USED FOR INFORMAL CHANNEL DIRECTLY BETWEEN CHIEFS OF STATION AND THE DCI. LETTERS ARE TO BE POUCHED ADDRESSED TO DCS IN PSEUDO IDEN SIGNED IN PSEUDONYM, AND SHOULD CARRY LWSURF INDICATOR BOTH ON OUTSIDE OF ENVELOPE AND ON LETTER ITSELF.

3. LWSURF LETTERS SHOULD BE NO MORE THAN TWO TYPEWRITTEN PAGES IN LENGTH, AND SHOULD NOT CONTAIN ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS OR REQUESTS. (THESE SHOULD BE COVERED IN NORMAL STAFF CORRESPONDENCE.)

4. GENERALLY LWSURF LETTERS CONTAIN A PARAGRAPH COVERING THE BIG PICTURE (POLITICAL ATMOSPHERICS), FOLLOWED BY OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, PERSONNEL, PROBLEMS, ETC.

5. LWSURF LETTERS MAY BE SENT AT ANY TIME, BUT THE CURRENT SCHEDULE CALLS FOR SUBMISSIONS EVERY SIX MONTHS. LETTERS FOR NE STATION CHIEFS ARE TO BE SUBMITTED IN NOVEMBER AND MAY.

6. NO FILE. RVW 220CT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#2005

29 October 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward J. Ganin

FROM : Donald C. Paquin
Chief of Station, Tehran

SUBJECT : LWSURF - Official Informal

Dear Edward,

It is four months since I met you as I prepared to leave for Tehran. The main impression of Iranian politics I have acquired in that period is that inconclusive elbowing and maneuvering for position are likely to continue for quite a while. The analysts tend to look at every development here as hastening (or postponing, as the case may be) an inevitable, decisive confrontation which will fairly soon either consolidate theocratic control or lead to its replacement by something else. I am more inclined to see the gradual erosion of Khomeini's personal authority as opening a period of disorderly -- sometimes violent -- competition, with no single contender possessing either enough guns or enough programatic appeal to overcome the opposition. Things could be very different if the military chose sides, but they are still thoroughly intimidated. Discipline is poor, professional elan practically nonexistent, and no prospective leaders have yet emerged who look as if they can restore institutional pride.

Khomeini has stumbled badly in Kurdistan, and the summary executions of Kurdish dissidents will not be forgotten. The government is now -- belatedly -- negotiating with the Kurds, but the pattern of Qom's relations with the ethnic minorities has already been set.

For all the growing dissatisfaction with the local brand of Islamic government, the radical left seems not to be profiting much -- mutually reinforcing anti-Russian and anti-communist sentiments at all levels of society make it difficult for the Communists to develop mass appeal or to penetrate the Army. There is, nevertheless, substantial communist influence in the universities and in the oil fields. If oil-financed imports are not enough to prevent a disastrous winter, economic distress will probably lead to rapid growth in Communist strength.

SECRET

DERIVATIVE CL BY 015356
☐ DECL ☒ REVW ON 29 Oct 99
DERIVED FROM D9c.1.

You asked me to comment at some point about our prospects for influencing the course of events. Only marginally, I would say, until the military recovers, and that is a process we can do almost nothing to affect. What we can do, and I am now working on, is to identify and prepare to support the potential leaders of a coalition of westernized political liberals, moderate religious figures, and (when they begin to emerge) western-oriented military leaders. The most likely catalyst for such a coalition is Ayatollah Shariat-Madari; I have compartmented contacts with several of his supporters.

Prospects are not bright for resuming operation of either of the TACKSMAN sites in a way which will provide us telemetry on Soviet missile testing. The reason is that this would require a degree of American participation which the Iranians are not likely to find politically acceptable. Accordingly, we are proceeding with an operation designed to provide clandestine collection of telemetry; this is proceeding well, and with some luck could be functioning fairly early in 1980.

You wanted me to comment on both non-official and military cover in the context of Tehran's operational requirements. I could make good use of an NOC officer, partly for contingency handling of sensitive sources, and partly to expand the Station's access to protected information on financial and economic matters, especially in the petroleum sector. My minimum requirement for access to the military has been met, as the Charge d'Affaires has at my request placed a Station officer in the Embassy's political-military slot. The addition of a uniformed officer would nevertheless be most useful.

I will be exploring these cover questions and other matters when I arrive at Headquarters on leave and consultation in mid-November. I look forward to seeing you then.

Best personal regards,

Donald C. Paquin

SECRET

SECRET
(TO BE CLASSIFIED WHEN FILLED IN)

CAUTION – THIS FORM REQUIRES SECURE STORAGE

TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST

No. 810189

TO	FROM
Edward J. Ganin	Chief of Station, Tehran

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION	REMARKS
1.	LWSURF letter for	herewith.
	Edward J. Ganin	
	SECRET	015756

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RELEASING OFFICER

FORM 0-73 1236a. USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (13-47)

SECRET
(TO BE CLASSIFIED WHEN FILLED IN)

CLASSIFIED BY

S E C R E T 240843Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 52799 (GLEIGOROFF ACTING)

TOF DIRECTOR

UNWINTEL RYBAT

REF: EMBASSY TEHRAN 4253

1. ICOS HAD LONG DISCUSSION 23 APRIL WITH CHARGE ABOUT AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI. TRIGGERED BY LONG REPORT CHARGE HAD GOTTE EARLIER IN DAY FROM AN AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN AND LONG-TIME RESIDENT OF IRAN (REF). ALTHOUGH NOT IDENTIFIED BY NAME IN REF, THE AMERIC IS MR. FRANK BURROWS, PRESIDENT OF IRAN-AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMER CHARGE REGARDS BURROWS' ROLE IN THIS AND PROSPECTS FOR STAYABILITY IN IRAN AS VERY DELICATE MATTERS, AND ASKED US NOT TO REPORT WARE.

2. PURPOSELY OMITTED FROM REF, ACCORDING TO CHARGE, WAS SHARIATMADARI'S COMPLAINT TO THE AMERICAN INTERLOCUTOR THAT SHARIATMADARI OCCASIONALLY FELT POORLY PREPARED TO DEAL WITH CURRENT POLITICAL ISSUES BECAUSE HE WAS NOT ALWAYS GETTING GOOD INFORMATION. HE ALLEGEDLY REFERRED TO RUMORS THAT RECENT TURMOIL IN KURDESTAN HAS BEEN FOMENTED TO LARGE EXTENT BY U.S.-EDUCATED STUDENTS--RECENT RETURNEES FROM THE STATES. HOW TO EVALUATE THESE REPORTS, SHARIATMADARI ASKED? HE SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT PEOPLE AROUND HIM WERE PROBABLY TRYING TO USE HIM FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES AND THAT WITHOUT CONTINUED FLOW OF THE FACTS, HE WAS POORLY EQUIPPED TO RESPOND RATIONALLY. CHARGE SAID HE INTERPRETED THIS AS IMPLY VEILED INVITATION FROM SHARIATMADARI FOR USG TO PROVIDE HIM WITH INFO AND KEEP HIM INFORMED. IN CHARGE'S OPINION, SHARIATMADARI COULD HAVE EXPECTED THAT HIS AMERICAN INTERLOCUTOR WOULD REPORT HA RESULTS OF MEETING TO EMBASSY.

3. AS HOS WILL HAVE SEEN, SHARIATMADARI, ALONG WITH TALEGHANI AND SENIOR AYATOLLAH IN KHUZESTAN, KHAGANI, ARE PUTTING MORE DISTANCE BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND KHOMEINI ON CERTAIN DIFFERENT ISSUES. SHARIATMADARI'S POPULARITY IS APPARENTLY INCREASING. A DEMONSTRATORS IN TABRIZ 25 APRIL PROTESTED AGAINST RECENT EDITORIAL ARTICLE WRITTEN BY PRO-KHOMEINI MULLAH WHICH OPPOSED CREATION OF

SHARIATMADARI'S MUSLIM PEOPLES REPUBLICAN PARTY OR IRAN. PRO-TESTORS APPARENTLY INSISTED THAT ANYONE INSULTING SHARIATMADARI SHOULD BE TRIED IN ISLAMIC COURT. THIS IS ALL TO REMINISCENT OF THE CLUMSY JANUARY 1978 NEWSPAPER ATTACK ON KHOMEINI, THE SPARK WHICH SET LOOSE THE FORCES WHICH ULTIMATELY TOPPLED SHAH. CURRENT ISLAMIC REGIME HAS ITS OWN SHARE OF HAM-HANDED ASSISTANTS.

4. RECALL THAT SOME THOUGHT WAS GIVEN TO CONTACTING SHARIAT-MADARI AT THE TIME STATION RECEIVED THE LINK TO SDFORGIVE/1. PLS PROVIDE OPS SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS CONTACTS, DIRECT OR OTHERWISE, STATION MAY HAVE HAD WITH SHARIATMADARI. ACCORDING TO PRESS, HE PLANNING LEAVE THE COUNTRY SOON ON VISIT TO EGYPT (THIS MAY BE GARBLE, SINCE IT SEEMS UNLIKELY PGOI WOULD WANT KEY FIGURE TO ABSENT HIMSELF AT THIS TIME).

5. SDVALID/1 PLANNING TO GO TO QOM 29 APRIL FOR COMMEMORATION FATHER'S DEATH. AND HE HAD AGREED TO CALL ON SHARIATMADARI FOR US (CLAIMS FAMILY KNOWS HIM WELL). WE WOULD NOT WANT TO GIVE V/1 ANY "MISSION" TO SERVE AS BRIDGE BETWEEN STATION AND SHARIATMADARI, AS WE ARE NOT SURE V/1 COULD HANDLE IT. BELIEVE MY'S REPORT OF SUBSTANCE OF CONVERSATION HE HAS WITH SHARIATMADARI AND WELCOME THE RECEIVES WILL GIVE SOME CLUE AS TO V/1'S POSSIBLE FUTURE UTILITY IN THIS ROLE.

6. REQ TRACES BURROWS.

7. FILE DEFER. RVW 24 APR 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

E C R E T

2 May 79 1 7 5 2

S E C R E T 0201572 MAY 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 430253.

TO: TEHRAN.

WNINTEL EYEAT

REF: TEHRAN 52799

1. HQS HAS NO RECORD OF ANY CONTACT WITH SHARIAT-MADARI. THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS INTEL REPORTS, DATING FROM 1966, WHICH GENERALLY SHOWED HIM TO HAVE FAIRLY DECENT RELATIONS WITH THE SHAH AND ALSO TO BE ON SAVAK'S PAYROLL. AS EXAMPLES OF THE LATTER A NOV 1970 REPORT NAMED HIM AS THE DIRECTOR OF THE QOM RELIGIOUS CENTER WHICH RECEIVED FUNDS FROM THE PRIME MINISTRY AND SAVAK. A 1971 REPORT NAMED SHARIAT-MADARI AS ONE OF THE MOST PROMINENT RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHO WAS WORKING WITH SAVAK TO FORM A RELIGIOUS CORPS. A 1975 REPORT SAID HE WAS A MAJOR RELIGIOUS FIGURE BEING PAID BY SAVAK. ASSUME STATION HAS RECEIVED SUFFICIENT BACKGROUND AND BIO FROM EMBASSY, BUT IF NOT PLEASE ADVISE AND HQS WILL FORWARD.

2. WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN SHARIAT-MADARI'S APPARENT DESI
O OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM USG. CONSIDER THIS TO OFFER EXCELLENT
POTENTIAL, AND WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE SUCH IF A SUITABLE
ANS OF DELIVERY TO HIM CAN BE FOUND. BASED ON REF WE ARE AWARE
BURROWS' DELICATE SITUATION BUT WONDER IF HE MIGHT AGREE TO
L SHARIAT-MADARI THAT USG WOULD PROVIDE CONFIDENTIAL (UN
LISH) INFORMATION TO HIM TO ASSIST HIM IN ASSESSING NOT ONLY
ERNAL SITUATION IRAN BUT ORIGINS AND EFFECTS OF THE IRAN
HLEN OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY. BURROWS COULD PERHAPS SUGGEST TO
THAT HE COULD APPOINT A TRUSTED COURIER (PREFERABLY ENGLISH
AKING) WHO WOULD PICK UP ITEMS AT A PRE-DETERMINED SITE. BELIE
T DIRECT EMBASSY CONTACTS WITH SHARIAT-MADARI WOULD DESTROY HI
AL CREDIBILITY. AFTER ARRANGEMENTS MADE BURROWS WOULD BOW OUT.
SSIBLE USE OF BURROWS SIMPLY OUR INITIAL THOUGHT BASED ON
ITED INFORMATION. SOLICIT DETAILED SUGGESTIONS FROM STATION
OTHER WAYS APPROACH AND DELIVERY COULD BE MADE. IF DECISION
MADE TO PASS INFORMATION TO SHARIAT-MADARI WE WOULD PROBABLY

WANT TO BEGIN WITH STATION SELECTED ITEMS FROM ARC OF [LO
MATERIAL. IF HE PROVES RECEPTIVE WE COULD MOVE ONTO MO
ENERAL TERMS WITH CHARGE.

3. NO TRACES BURROWS. WOULD APPRECIATE BIO DATA
EARANCE IF OPS INVOLVEMENT PLANNED.

4. NO FILE. RFW 1 MAY 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

C R E T
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53

[redacted]

S E C R E T 061208Z MAY 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 32947 (GLEGORN EXCITING)

TO: DIRECTOR

[redacted]

WHINTEL SOVALID ORBOLSTER

REFS: A. TEHRAN-32793

B. DIRECTOR-450253

1. SOVALID/1 REPORTED 4 MAY THAT HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN AUDIENCE WITH SHARIATMADARI IN QOM ON APRIL. V/1 WAS ECSTATIC OVER RESULTS OF THE SESSION, WHICH WERE CLEARLY BEYOND HIS EXPECTATIONS. WHILE THERE IS SOME THIN INTEL TAKE FROM THE MEETING THE ATMOSPHERICS ARE MORE INTERESTING THAN THE INFORMATION PASSED. FOLLOWING IS V/1'S ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING.

2. AFTER SHARIATMADARI HAD ACKNOWLEDGED KNOWING V/1'S FATHER AND FAMILY, V/1 EXPLAINED HIS PERSONAL BACKGROUND AND SAID THAT HE WAS BRINGING A MESSAGE OF GOOD WISHES TO SHARIATMADARI FROM HIS IRANIAN AND AMERICAN FRIENDS IN THE U.S. V/1 SAID SHARIAT-MADARI WARMED TO THIS, AFTER WHICH V/1 SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK SHARIATMADARI A FEW QUESTIONS.

3. SHARIATMADARI'S RESPONSES TO V/1'S QUERIES DID NOT, FOR THE MOST PART, ADD ANYTHING TO WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN REPORTED IN PRESS AND STATE TRAFFIC ABOUT SHARIATMADARI'S POLITICAL POSITIONS. SHARIATMADARI TOLD V/1 THAT HE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED WITH BAZARGAN WHO HE SAID LETS HIMSELF BE USED BY "OTHERS". HE DID SAY THAT "AMERICAN FRIENDS" TO KNOW WHERE HE STOOD ON ISSUES. THEY SHOULD READ TEXT OF THE CABLE HE SENT TO AYATOLLAH SHAYKH MUHAMMAD KHAGANI KHUZESTAN'S TOP CLERGYMAN, IN LATE APRIL WHEN THE LATTER WAS THREATENING TO QUIT IRAN UNLESS KOMITEH ACTIVITIES THERE WERE NUT BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL. (STATION TRYING TO LOCATE NEWS STORY ON CABLE AND GET TRANSLATION.) SHARIATMADARI SAID THAT WHILE KHOMEINI AND TALEGHANI WERE APPEALING TO KHAGANI NOT TO LEAVE IRAN AND WERE INVITING HIM TO COME TO QOM FOR TALKS, SHARIATMADARI HAD ADVISED KHAGANI NOT TO LEAVE ABADAN AT ALL, EVEN TO GO TO QOM, SINCE THE COUNTRY NEEDED HIM THERE.

[redacted]

PAGE 2 TEHRAN 32947 S E C R E T

4. V/1 INQUIRED ABOUT SHARIATMADARI'S VIEW OF DRAFT CONSTITUTION. SHARIATMADARI SAID HE HAD BEEN SHOWN THE DIRST DRAFT PRIOR TO ITS PUBLICATION AND HAD BEEN ASKED FOR HIS COMMENTS. HE THEN SMIRKED AND TOLD V/1 "WE HAVE ADDED OUR COMMENTS, DUE TO DO SO WE HAD TO APPEND SEVERAL NEW SHEETS OF PAPER." V/1 HAD IMPRESSION THAT SHARIATMADARI THOUGHT CONSTITUTION LEFT A LOT TO BE DESIRED. HE TOLD V/1 THAT HE FORESAW THE CONSTITUTION BEING APPROVED IN ABOUT THREE MONTHS, BUT THAT IT WOULD TAKE SIX OR SEVEN MONTHS BEFORE ELECTIONS COULD BE HELD.

5. V/1 TOLD C/O THAT SEVERAL TIMES DURING MEETING HE THOUGHT HE HAD OVERSTAYED HIS WELCOME WITH SHARIATMADARI, BUT THAT EACH WHEN HE TRIED TO LEAVE, SHARIATMADARI HAD INSISTED THAT HE NOT. WHEN V/1 ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SEE HIM AGAIN, SHARIATMADARI RESPONDED "COME ONCE, TWICE, AS OFTEN AS YOU LIKE." V/1 SAID OTHERS WAITING TO SEE SHARIATMADARI THOUGHT V/1 HAD A SPECIAL "HINT" WITH HIM, AND ASKED HIM ON WAY OUT TO ACT AS INTER-MEDIARY FOR THEM.

6. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT HOW BADLY V/1 WANTED TO SUCCEED IN THIS ASSIGNMENT AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR EMBELLISHMENT, V/1'S REPORT IS STILL CONSISTENT WITH RECENT INDICATIONS THAT SHARIAT-MADARI MAY WANT TO DEVELOP SOME WORKABLE CHANNEL TO THE U.S.G. (SEPARATE MESSAGE REPORTING SDJANUS/1'S PROPOSAL IN THIS REGARD FOLLOWS.) BELIEVE IT MAY BE WORTHWHILE TO SEND V/1 TO QOM AGAIN ONCE WE DECIDE IF AND HOW TO PURSUE THIS OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITY.

7. FILE: 201-0595311. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 101222Z MAY 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 53023 (GLEYSTEEN ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

WINDTEL RYEAT

REFS: A. TEHRAN 52799
B. DIRECTOR 143253
C. TEHRAN 52847
D. TEHRAN 52968

1. REFS ALL CONCERNED WITH REPORTED INDICATIONS THAT AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI MAY WISH A LINK WITH THE U.S.G.

2. AS FOLLOW-UP TO REF A, ACCOMPANIED PARTICIPATED IN FOUR-WAY CONVERSATION AT SOCIAL FUNCTION LAST MAY 8 INVOLVING MR. BURROWS AND TWO EMBASSY OFFICERS STEMPEL AND HYLAND ON SUBJECT OF BURROWS' MEETING WITH SHARIATMADARI. BURROWS IS HARDLY A RELUCTANT SOURCE ON SUBJECT, AND IN FACT HAS BEEN ACTIVELY PROMOTING A MEETING BETWEEN EMBASSY OFFICERS AND SHARIATMADARI, WHOM HE DESCRIBES AS AMERICAN BUSINESS'S BEST HOPE IN IRAN. BURROWS' TERM CRITICAL OF EMBASSY CAUTION IN TALKING WITH SHARIATMADARI. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS BURROWS' IDEA THAT MEETING TAKE PLACE. IT WAS NOT REQUESTED BY SHARIATMADARI. BURROWS BASICALLY BELIEVES WE SHOULD MASSAGE SHARIATMADARI, ENCOURAGE HIS MODERATE VIEWS SO THAT HE WILL FEEL ASSURED THAT IT WAS U.S. BLESSING AS WELL AS SUPPORT FOR U.S. CONCEPT OF NEED FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS TO REMAIN IN IRAN. BURROWS OFFERED TO INTRODUCE EMBASSY OFFICER TO THE INTERMEDIARY, [illegible] WHO HAD ARRANGED HIS OWN MEETING WITH SHARIATMADARI.

3. OUR PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT FOR MR. BURROWS IS THAT HE WOULD NOT BE SUITABLE FOR ROLE DESCRIBED REF B. HE WOULD PROBABLY FEEL THIS WAS EMBASSY BUSINESS WHICH EMBASSY SHOULD HANDLE, AND IT IS ONLY TANGENTIAL TO THE OBJECTIVES WHICH MR. BURROWS WOULD LIKE TO SEE SERVED; FURTHERMORE, PUMPING SHARIATMADARI UP AS ANTI-KHOMEINI ANTI-BUSINESS XENOPHOBIC ACTS. WE ALSO CANNOT BE CERTAIN THAT THE SURPRISES OF [illegible] ARE ACCUMULATED REFLECTION

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 53023 S E C R E T
OF SHARIATMADARI'S WISHES, OR EVEN THAT SHARIATMADARI HIMSELF DESIRES CONTACT WITH U.S.G.

4. THE APPROACH THROUGH SDJANUS/13 IS SOMEWHAT SIMILAR. IN THIS ONE, A SUBORDINATE OF SHARIATMADARI MADE THE MOVE AND AGAIN WE CANNOT BE SURE SHARIATMADARI APPROVES.

5. NONETHELESS, THE DOOR IS OPEN TO BACK SHARIATMADARI AND FIND HIS OWN PARTY. GIVEN KHOMEINI'S PUBLIC CHARGES THAT THE AMERICANS ARE OUT TO SPLIT THE UNITY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT, ANY MOVES TOWARD CONTACT WITH SHARIATMADARI MUST BE MADE CAREFULLY AND WITH UTMOST ATTENTION TO SECURITY. WE BELIEVE A CLEARER PICTURE OF SHARIATMADARI'S OWN POSITION AND CONTACT WITH THE U.S. AND HIS EXPECTATIONS FROM SUCH CONTACT IS NEEDED. WE WILL ATTEMPT ACQUIRE THIS INFORMATION. OUR OBJECTIVE IN THIS AS IN KHOMEINI CHARGES, WOULD BE TO SPLIT AND WEAKEN THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT SO THAT MORE RATIONAL VOICES CAN BE HEARD. WE SOLICIT HQS GUIDANCE AS TO VALIDITY THIS OBJECTIVE FROM POLICY VIEWPOINT.

6. FILE DEFER. RVW 12MAY99 DRV DPJ.1. ALL PORTIONS

S E C R E T

11 MAY 79 01 04Z

E C R E T 1100292 MAY 79 STAFF

TE DIRECTOR 436211.

: PRIORITY TEHRAN.

NINIEL RYBAT SDJANUS

EF: A. TEHRAN 52969
B. DIRECTOR 450253
C. TEHRAN 52999

1. APPRECIATE INFO ON SDJANUS/13'S (J/13) CONTACT WITH
HARIAT-MADARI (SMD) GROUP. WE ACCEPT J/13'S INFO RE CONTACTS AS IN
AST HE HAS APPEARED TO BE POLITICAL ANIMAL AND PROBABLY STILL SEES
IMSELF AS EVENTUAL CHIEF OF A NEW SERVICE UNDER A SM DOMINATED
OVT. BASED ON SM'S COMMENTS TO BURROWS, SDVALID/1'S MEETING WITH
M, AND NOW J/13'S INFO, WE CAN MAKE A STRONG ASSUMPTION THAT SM
S PUTTING OUT FEELERS TO US. IN REF B WE EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN
ROVIDING SM WITH INFORMATION HE CLAIMED HE NEEDED. WE STILL WANT
O DO SO, PROVIDED A SATISFACTORY CHANNEL CAN BE FOUND. WHIL
/13 CERTAINLY SEEMS TO OFFER A CHANNEL, WE ARE UNCERTAIN AS TO
HE ADVISABILITY OF PASSING IT THROUGH A FORMER SDJANUS OFFICIAL,
R FOR THAT MATTER IF SM WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT IT THROUGH
/13. HOWEVER, DO NOT WISH ELIMINATE THIS OPTION UNTIL AFTER OTHER
XPLORED AND FOUND WANTING.

2. IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF THIS IS PROPER TIME (GIVEN THE
CONTINUING CHAOS ON THE IRANIAN SCENE) TO BEGIN PLANNING FOR
OLITICAL ACTION, WE WILL NEED MORE FACTS FROM STATION ABOUT THE
OCAL SITUATION. OUR POLITICAL ACTION GOAL IN IRAN WOULD BE
O PROMOTE A GOVT FAVORABLE TO U.S. INTERESTS. TO GIVE
ONSIDERATION TO SM'S PARTY AS ONE MEANS OF ACHIEVING OUR GOA
E MUST DETERMINE ITS STRENGTH AND DEPTH. HOW DID J/13 ARRIVE
AT HIS FIGURE OF EIGHT MILLION PEOPLE READY TO JOIN? IS SM
CALLING THE SHOTS FOR THE PARTY, OR IS HE MERELY INTENDED TO BE A
FIGUREHEAD? WHO IS THE UNIDENTIFIED NUMBER TWO MAN J/13 IS IN
CONTACT WITH? WHO ARE THE IMPORTANT CADRE? IF J/13 CAN ANSWER
THESE AND OTHER QUESTIONS IT WILL HELP US DETERMINE IF SM'S PARTY
IS A VIABLE ENTITY.

E 2 DIRECTOR 436211 S E C R E T

3. HQS HAS NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO HOSAFI, FIROUZI, OR SAID
ID. A LONG SHOT ON HOSAFI MIGHT BE ALI ASSAFI (ENCRYPTED
N). 201-789983, WHO WAS NEW CHIEF DEPT VIII IN SEPT 1978.
OUZI POSSIBLE DR. SEOFOLLAH FORUZIN, DPOB 1920 RESHT. HELD
URITY JOBS IN G-2, JOINED SDJANUS 1957 AS CHIEF JUDICIAL
TION DEPT III. BECAME DEPUTY CHIEF DEPT III IN 1963. IN LATE
0'S AND IN 1970'S IN CHARGE OF DEPT I ADMINISTRATION (PERSONNEL
FINANCE). AS OF JUNE 1975 WAS GRADE NINE (HIGHEST POSSIBLE).
WAS ANTI-SHAH, REPORTEDLY ARRESTED IN NY FOR DEMONSTRATING
INST EMPRESS FARAH. IN VIEW SON'S ACTIVITIES FORUZI SUBMITTED
IGNATION, WHICH MADE SDRED FURIOUS. SDRED DECLINED ACCEPT
IGNATION.

4. FIELD SECURITY CHECK ON FARRID WOULD INVOLVE CHECKING ON
GHBORS, EMPLOYEES, ETC. WHICH HQS PREFERS NOT TO DO AT THIS
E. ALSO, IF FARRID U.S. PERSON, WE WOULD HAVE TO OBTAIN HIS
MISSION PRIOR TO SUCH A CHECK. ONE MOHAMMED SAID FARID
778@91). IRANIAN STUDENT AT NYU 1965, WAS ACTIVE IN TUDEH.
RITY HAS FILE ON ONE S. RAHMI FARID DPOB 27 SEP 1962 IRAN.
RETIRED AND POSSIBLY DESTROYED BUT WE ARE CHECKING AND WILL
ESE. WILL ALSO QUERY SDENORMOUS/1 NEXT OPPORTUNITY.

5. HAVE ADVISED J/13 SON IN PARIS THAT TEHRAN CONTACT
IATED AND NO NEED DISCUSS MATTER ON PHONE WITH J/13. ALSO
SON THAT IF FURTHER CONTACT VIA CUMMISKY NECESSARY SON
D ADVISE US AND WE WILL PUT HIM IN TOUCH WITH PARIS OFFICER
CAN RELAY MESSAGES SECURELY. SON AGREES.

6. SM ASSIGNED 201-BELOW.

7. FILE: 201-960845. RVW 9 MAY 99 DRM D90.1: ALL SECRET.

R E T

12 Mar 79 02 03z

E C R E T 1201582 MAY 78 STAFF

ITE DIRECTOR 437267.

O: TEHRAN.

NINTEL RYBAT

EFS: A. TEHRAN 53023
B. DIRECTOR 43 0253
C. DIRECTOR 43 6211

1. BASED ON REF A COMMENTS RE BURROWS AGREE WITH STATION RE
DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE THE CONDUIT FOR WHICH WE ARE SEARCHING. OUR
ORIGINAL SUGGESTION RE USE OF BURROWS WAS FOUNDED ON BELIEF
SHARIAT-MADARI HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE, RATHER THAN BURROWS. WE
SHARE STATION'S VIEW THAT WE MUST BE CERTAIN SHARIAT-MADARI HAS
A CHANNEL TO THE USG BEFORE WE ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH IT, AND THAT IF
ESTABLISHED IT MUST BE AS SECURE AS POSSIBLE.

2. OUR INTENTION IN ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH SHARIAT-
MADARI IS TO HELP DEVELOP A "MODERATE OPTION." OUR GOAL IS NOT
TO SPLIT THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT BUT RATHER TO EXPAND THE MODERATE
FORCES WITHIN IT TO THE POINT WHERE THEY BECOME DOMINANT. THE
EXISTENCE OF A STRONG MODERATE FACTION DOMINATING THE ISLAMIC
MOVEMENT MIGHT WELL ATTRACT, AT LEAST IN THE FORM OF A COALITION
THOSE WITH MODERATE SECULAR VIEWS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. WHILE THE
RADICAL LEFTISM FACTIONS WOULD OBVIOUSLY REMAIN ENEMIES OF ANY
MODERATE MOVEMENT THEY WOULD AGAIN BE FORCED INTO THE POSITION OF
EXTREMISTS OF THE LEFT. HOPEFULLY, A BROAD BASED MODERATE MOVEMENT
WOULD EMERGE WITH SMALL LEFTIST AND RIGHTIST GROUPS ON THE FLANKS.

3. HOWEVER, ALL OF THE ABOVE IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION
SOMETHING CLOSE TO NORMAL POLITICAL ACTIVITY CAN EXIST. THE
PRESENT REALITY IS THAT THE GUNS, AND THUS THE REAL POWER, ARE
IN THE HANDS OF THE RADICALS. UNLESS SOME FORM OF REGIMENTAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATION (E.G. THE ARMY) IS RESURRECTED, AND
MODERATE IRANIANS GATHER UP THE COURAGE TO FORCEFULLY EXPRESS
THEIR VIEWS, THE PROPER CLIMATE TO PERMIT THE DEVELOPMENT OF
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS WILL NOT BE PRESENT. ALTERNATIVELY, DOM

HE SHARIAT-MADARI GROUP HAVE ITS OWN ARMED BACKERS? DO ANY OF
HE CURRENTLY EXISTING ARMED FACTIONS EITHER SHOW SUPPORT FOR
HARIAT-MADARI OR COULD THEY BE ATTRACTED TO HIS MOVEMENT?

4. WE HAVE EXPRESSED IN REF C OUR POLITICAL ACTION GOAL,
HICH IS TO PROMOTE A GOVT FAVORABLE TO U.S. INTERESTS. IN THE
URRENT POLITICAL SITUATION. THIS GOAL CAN PROBABLY BEST BE ATTAINED
HROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MODERATE, POPULARLY SUPPORTED GOVT
HICH IS EITHER LED, OR HAS THE BLESSING OF, THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY
ND HAS THE STRENGTH TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER. WHILE THE GOAL IS
IMPLE TO DEFINE WE ARE STILL IN SEARCH OF THE MECHANISMS TO
TTAIN IT AND ENCOURAGE STATION COMMENTS AND IDEAS IN THIS VEIN.

5. FILE: 201-960845. RVW 11 MAY 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL

ECRET.
E C R E T

S E C R E T 161317Z MAY 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 5309 (CLEGGROFF (ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT SDJANUS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 436211

B. DIRECTOR 437257

1. REFS WERE EXCELLENT. BELIEVE WE ARE NOW CLOSE TOGETH
IMPOR THINKING RE WHAT COULD DEVELOP INTO A MAJOR AND EXTREMELY
VALUABLE OPERATIONAL UNDERTAKING.

2. FOLLOWING INFO OBTAINED FROM 13 MAY PHONE CONVERSATIO
WITH SDJANUS/13 (J/13) AND FROM NOTES WRITTEN BY J/13 WHICH WERE
PASSED TO ME LOTTE EVENING. WE MAY BY IDEN WHO IS FRIEND WHO
IS SOLICITING J/13'S IDEA OF NVBLAZON SUPPORT FOR COOPERATION
WITH SHARIATMADARI. S-M HAS BEEN DISCUSSED SOLELY BETWEEN J/13
AND IDEN, AND MEIRLOTTE HAS ADVISED J/13 THAT THIS MUST REMAIN
THE CASE UNTIL WE AND HEADQUARTERS CAN WEIGH THE SITUATION.
IDEN'S ORIGINAL IDEA WAS TO OBTAIN FUNDS FROM WEALTHY SAVAK OF-
FICIALS WHO HAVE FLED ABROAD. J/13 SUGGESTED THAT HE (J/13)
DISCUSS POSSIBILITY WITH RIAGTION. BOTH J/13 AND IDEN BELIEVE
THAT S-M WOULD WELCOME SUPPORT IF A VIABLE AND ABSOLUTELY SE-
CURE CHANNEL WAS ESTABLISHED. THEY ALSO BELIEVE S-M WOULD AGREE
TO MEET DIRECTLY, BUT THIS REMAINS A MOOT QUESTION IN ABSENCE
S-M ASSURANCES, ETC. STATION SEES ADVANTAGE OF DIRECT CONTACT
WITH S-M AS ONE OF PROVIDING US WITH CLEAR KNOWLEDGE WE ARE IN-
DEED WIRED INTO S-M. IN ADDITION TO KNOWING EXACTLY WHAT S-M IS
ATTEMPTING TO ACCOMPLISH. BUT INDIRECT CONTACT WOULD OBVIOUSLY
BE MORE SECURE AND PROVIDE PLAUSIBLE DENIAL OF RELATIONSHIP TO
S-M. IT MIGHT ALSO PERMIT US TO WORK ON IDEN AS UNILATERAL
PENETRATION S-M GROUP.

3. J/13 DESCRIBES IDEN AS A SUCCESSFUL ROAD AND BUILDING
CONTRACTOR, A SHIITE WHO HAS BEEN CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE
REVOLUTION, AND WHO REMAINS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO S-M AND HIS PARTY.
J/13 SAYS IDEN IS VERY POPULAR SOCIALLY AND IS A SOLID LIBERAL-

DEMOCRAT. UNFORTUNATELY, HE DOES NOT KNOW ENGLISH. J/13
THAT HE TRUSTS IDEN COMPLETELY AND MEIRLOTTE MUST ADD THAT IDEN
HANDLED OUR CAR BRUSH PASS IN A DISCIPLINED AND COOL MANNER.
HE WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET CASE OFFICER DIRECTLY IN TEHRAN OR
ABROAD IF DISCUSSIONS WERE CONDUCTED IN FARSI.

4. J/13 HOLDS FIRM WITH HIS FIGURE OF $5,000,000 FOR S-M
WHO ARE PRESENTLY LOYAL TO SHAH AND CLAIMS THAT MORE WILL FOLLOW
AS EXPECTED. S-M HAS THE AZERBAIJANI COMMUNITY BEHIND HIM AND
ADDITIONAL CLAIMED SUPPORT FROM THE RADICAL PARTY OF RAHMATOL-
LAH MOGHADAM, MARA'HEH'S GORAN GROUPS, SOME KURDS AND VARIOUS
BUSINESSMEN AND WORKERS ASSOCIATIONS IN TEHRAN AND ONE MOMTAM LOYAL TO CHERIKS.
3-5,000 MUJAHIDIN IN TEHRAN, SOME CONTROLS
J/13 WILL PROVIDE DETAILS LATER. BUT CITES PROPHET SAYED SADRODDIN
BALAGHI, IDEN, DR. AHMAD ALIZADEH, HOJATOLESLAM SAYED HADI
KHOSROWSHAHI, SHAH SON KUNIDENTIFIED, AND SHAHEDI PIZADEH
AS PARTY LEADERS.
TEHRAN AND TABRIZ. THE PARTY CENTRAL ORGANIZATION IS PLANNED FOR
OFFICES IN AZERBAIJAN, KHORASTAN, GUILAN, QOM, AND SOME KURDISH
AREAS. ACCORDING TO J/13, S-M HAS OR CAN GET PRESS BACKING FROM
THE KHALGHE-MUSLIM GROUP (NOT FURTHER DEFINED). J/13 AND
IDEN CLAIM S-M HAS ITS OWN PARTY FUNDS ARE LIMITED CONSIDERING THE
ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS AT HAND. IDEN ADDS THAT MORE FUNDS ALSO
MEAN MORE ARMED MUJAHIDIN. RE PARTY DECISIONS, IDEN SAYS THAT
S-M MAKES MOST JUDGEMENTS, BUT SOMETIMES DISCUSSES WITH HIS
PARTY ADVISORS (BETA ION WILL ASK IF THIS INCLUDES IDEN). AC-
CORDING TO J/13, S-M'S RECENT ATTACK ON ISLAMIC COURTS, ETC.
IS THE BEGINNING OF A CAMPAIGN WHEREBY S-M WILL SPEAK OUT ON
IMPORTANT PUBLIC ISSUES. MEIRLOTTE ASKED J/13 AGAIN IF S-M
WOULD INDEED IN OPPOSITION TO KHOMEINI AND J/13 SAID THAT HE
DO OR THREE MONTHS TO MAKE THIS BREAK WHEN THE TIME WAS OPPORTUNE.

5. FYI. BUT NOT PARA FOUR REF A IS A GREEN CARD HOLDER
AND IS THE SON OF AYATOLLAH HAJI SAMJANI, WHO ACCORDING TO J/13
IS HIGHLY RESPECTED. J/13 SAID OVER THE PHONE THAT HE WOULD
INCLUDE A COPY OF [illegible] PLUS SAID OVER THE PHONE THAT HE WOULD
CRUSAL, BUT THIS [illegible] FACT. S NEW JERSEY PUBLICATION FOR OUR
SUBJECT SHOULD [illegible] WAS NOT INCLUDED DURING OUR BRUSH CONTACT.
E MIGHT ABLY SERVE AS S-M FUND RAISER/PUBLIC RELATIONS SPOKES-

Tehran

PAGE 3 TEHRAN 53095 S E C R E T

MAN. WITH MANY WEALTHY IRANIANS HAVING FLED ABROAD, THE PROBLEM IS NOT SO MUCH THE LACK OF MONEY FOR S-M AS GETTING A FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN ORGANIZED AND UNDER WAY. IF REACTION IS TO PLAY A COVERT ROLE IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, WE MIGHT SUGGEST OFFERING S-M PROFESSIONAL ADVICE ON THE TECHNIQUES OF FUND RAISING AND THE MECHANICS OF HOW TO MOUNT A PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPES PLUS "SEED MONEY" TO GET THEIR EFFORT STARTED. IN TRUTH MANY MODERATE VOICES IN IRAN ARE INTIMIDATED AND TRAUMATIZED BY KHOMEINI'S KONITARY TACTICS AND EVEN J/13 AND IDEN SAY THAT THE S-M PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE SOMEWHAT BEHIND THE POWER CURVE AND THAT TIME IS RUNNING OUT.

6. REQUEST PRIORITY HEADQUARTERS TRACES ON IDEN. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE DESK ANALYSIS (IDENTIFICATION AND POWER RELATIONSHIPS OF AMSS AND GROUPS) CITED IN PARA FOUR ABOVE. IT IS QUITE EVIDENT THAT J/13 HAD DIFFICULTY IN WRITING IN ENGLISH AND WE WILL ASK HIM FOR VERBAL CLARIFICATION WHEN WE SPEAK KEY PHONE ON 20 MAY. WITH HEADQUARTERS CONCURRENCE, WE PLAN NEXT TO DISCUSS WITH J/13 THE QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT IDEN CAN APPROACH RE POSSIBILITY OF COVERT NVBLAZON (NOT RTACTION) CONTACT WITH S-M. AT THIS JUNCTURE, J/13'S ROLE WOULD NOT BE MENTIONED TO

7. FILE: 201-508453, 201-149066. RVW 16 MAY 99 DRV D90.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 161342Z MAY 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 53094 (LEGOROFF ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WINTEL RYBAT SDJANUS

REF: TEHRAN 53095

1. IDEN: MR. SEYED M O R T E Z A M O S S A D I
DOB: CIRCA 1926
DIRECTOR AND CHAIRMAN OF IRANCELSO AND
TO TEHRAN.

2. FILE: 201-508453, 201-149066. RVW 16 MAY 99 DRV

S E C R E T



SECRET 011416Z MAY 79 STAFF

OTE TEHRAN 5166 (GLEGOROFF ACTING)

T DIRECTOR

W KNIGHT RYBAT

REF: A. TEHRAN 52929
B. DIRECTOR 436211
C. DIRECTOR 437267
D. TEHRAN 53023
E. TEHRAN 53105

1. PROPOSE TAKE FOLLOWING OPERATIONAL STEPS IN ORDER TO DETERMINE DESIRABILITY AND POTENTIAL OF DEVELOPING CLANDESTINE HAVE TO SHARE MADARI KSM:

A. THROUGH SDJANUS/15, CONTINUE TO DEVELOP NEEDED INSIGHT AS TO KSM'S MUSLIM PEOPLES REPUBLICAN PARTY (MPRP). REPORTS CREATION OF THIS CHANNEL. SEEK TO PENETRATE KSM'S MOVEMENT UNLESS SHE LEAVES THE COUNTRY IT IS PROBABLY UNWISE FROM SECURITY STANDPOINT TO MEET HIM DIRECTLY.

B. SEND SDVALID/1 BACK TO QOM FOR ANOTHER VISIT WITH [illegible] COULD IN EFFECT BE A TROLLING EXERCISE, WITH WI ALERT FOR ANY SIGNALS GIVEN OUT BY KSM BUT NOT PRESENTING HIMSELF AS BEING THERE AS AN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF ANYBODY.

C. GUIDE SDROTTER/4 [illegible] MAXIMIZE THE EFFECT HE IS ABLE TO HAVE ON THE CONSTRUCTIVE OPPOSITION AND TO MAXIMIZE HIS FI AND CA VALUES TO US. IN THIS REGARD, HAVE ALREADY RECOMMENDED TO R/4 THAT HE CAST HIS LOT WITH THE NATIONAL FRONT (NF), PROVIDING THE NF REWARDS HIM WITH AN INFLUENTIAL POSITION. WITHIN THE NF, R/4 SHOULD WORK TO BUILD A FORCE THAT IS MODERATE AND PRO-U.S. WHILE REPORTING REGULARLY ON DEVELOPMENTS. STATION HAS ALREADY SUGGESTED TO R/4 THAT HE BEGIN FULL-SCALE POLITICAL ACTIVITY NOW. WE HAVE SUGGESTED [illegible] (A) AHMAD SADR HAJ SEYED JAVADI.



PAGE 2 TEHRA [illegible] SECRET
THE INTERIOR M [illegible] STER, TO GET A BETTER FIX ON THE PGOI'S PLANS FOR ELECTION [illegible] SM IN QOM AND KHAGANI IN KHORRAMSHAHR. R/4 SAYS THIS IS A [illegible] OD IDEA AND HE INTENDS TO DO IT AND TRY TO EXPLORE P [illegible] TIES OF A LASH-UP. (C) GENERAL JAM IN LONDON. THIS R/4 [illegible] TO DO ON HIS NEXT TRIP ABROAD. HE LIKES JAM AND BELIE [illegible] AS A ROLE TO PLAY AT THE PROPER TIME. R/4 IS STILL MOV [illegible] HIS IDEA OF A QASHQAI TRIBAL COUNCIL WHICH COULD PRO [illegible] RMAT FOR THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF AND COORDINAT [illegible] OTHER TRIBAL GROUPS.

2. W [illegible] E TOLD R/4 OF OUR PLEASURE AT SEEING HIM AND ADMIRAL MA [illegible] AHEAD WITH THE PLAN TO ESTABLISH A NEWSPAPER IN TEHRAN. A [illegible] GH NOTHING IN THIS REGARD WAS SAID TO R/4 AT OUR LAST MEE [illegible] IT MAY BE WORTH SUPPORTING R/4 IN THIS VENTURE OR [illegible] AND MADANI HAVE PLENTY OF MONEY, BUT WOULD WELCOME EX [illegible]

3. AS [illegible] E PLAN SUGGESTS, IT WOULD BE OUR OBJECTIVE TO BRING TO [illegible] U.S. MODERATES FROM THE RELIGIOUS, SECULAR POLITICAL AND [illegible] Y SPHERES, PROBABLY USING R/4 AS OUR PRIMARY ACTION VEH [illegible] ND CATALYST. THE CLANDESTINE CHANNEL TO SM ANGLE NEEDS T [illegible] E RESEARCHED MORE, BUT R/4 IS READY TO GO AND MAY OBVIAT [illegible] EED TO CREATE SUCH A CHANNEL IF R/4 CAN HIMSELF DEVELO [illegible] ALLIANCE OF SORTS WITH SM (WE COULD, IF WE CHOSE, DUMP IN M [illegible] Y FOR SM THROUGH R/4).

4. WE [illegible] HIS COMMENTS.

5. [illegible] SECRET [illegible] ER. RVW 21 MAY 99 DRV DOC 1. ALL SECRET.

25 MAY [illegible] Z

E C R E T 2423332 MAY 79 STATE

ITE DIRECTOR 445413, SECTION 1 OF 2.

O: PRIORITY TEHRAN.

NINTEL RYBAT SDJANUS.

EFS: A. TEHRAN 5309[illegible]
B. DIRECTOR 436211

1. NO HQS TRACES ON MORTEZA MOSSAVI.

2. RAHMATOLLAH MOGHADAM-MARAGHEH AKA LT COL MOGHADAM IS SUBJECT 201-237926, ENCRYPTED HDEN, WAS GRANTED OA NOV 1961 FOR USE POLITICAL REPORTING AS WELL AS BLACK PROPAGANDIZING THROUGH THIRD PARTY. WAS LONGTIME FRIEND OF TEHRAN STATION DATING BACK TO 1953. COPENHAGEN 25817, 28 FEB 79 REPORTED HE HAD BEEN APPOINTED GOVERNOR OF AZERBAIJAN AND THAT SDPRANK/1 DESCRIBED HIM AS HIS CLOSEST FRIEND IN IRAN. (A 17 MAY 79 WIRE SERVICE REPORT SHOWS HE STILL IS GOVERNOR.) HE WAS ALSO ONCE MAYOR OF TEHRAN. COPENHAGEN STATED IF INTERESTED THEY COULD PROBABLY ENCOURAGE MORE INTENSIVE CONTACT BY SDPRANK/1. PER OCR INFO LAMBRAKIS VISITED HOME OF RAHMATOLLAH MOGHADAM 12 JUNE 78. PRESENT WERE FOUR LEADERS OF OPPOSITION MOVEMENT, BAZARGAN, SANJABI, FOROUHAR, AND SEYEDJAVADI. THEY TOLD LAMBRAKIS THAT SHAHBESTARIZADEH HAD RECENTLY DELIVERED A MESSAGE TO THEM FROM SM ASSURING THEM SM WOULD NOT TALK WITH GOI OR REACH ANY AGREEMENTS WITHOUT INCLUDING THEM. SHAHBESTARIZADEH WAS OPPOSITION LEADER WITH FIRST NAMES OF HAJI HASHAM. EMBASSY SHOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE FULL BIO. IF NOT ADVISE AND WE WILL FORWARD.

3. WE HAVE NO INFO ON GORAN GROUP BUT BELIEVE GORAN MAY BE INCORRECT TRANSLITERATION OF KORAN. IDENTITY OF KHALQ-E MUSALMAN IS UNCERTAIN. IN A DEBRIEFING OF SDPRETEXT/1 HE IDENTIFIE THIS GROUP AS SHARIAT-MADARI'S (SM) PARTY. HOWEVER, ANOTHER GROUP WHICH USES THE SAME NAME IN PERSIAN, USES ENGLISH NAME OF ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MUSLIM MASSES OF IRAN. IT IS CENTERE IN KHORASAN PROVINCE.

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 445413 S E C R E T

4. A NO INFO ON BALAGHI, ALIZADEH, OR KHOSROWSHAMI.

5. HNITA-15206, 29 NOV 1960, REPORTED AN AITOLLAH SEYED BUIK SANJANI AS PROMINENT LEADER OF DEVOTEES OF THE SHAH PARTY. HE WAS ALSO MENTIONED AS A POSSIBLE BRITISH AGENT. WE WILL ADVISE FURTHER WHAT RECORDS SEARCH REVEALS ON THIS.

6. RE PARA 4 REF B FARID TURNED OUT TO BE A SURGEON IN A BRAZIL (INDIAN) HOSPITAL.

7. FROM ABOVE TRACES, INFO FROM J/13, AND OTHER SOURCES, WE CAN ASCERTAIN THAT SM'S MUSLIM PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTI EXISTS IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT SM'S APPEAL TO MODERATES WILL MAKE HIM A FACTOR TO BE RECKONED WITH IN THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF IRAN IF HE DECIDES TO BECOME ACTIVE. HOWEVER, AT PRESENT OTHER FORCES OF EQUAL, OR PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANCE, ARE ALSO IN EXISTENCE. ACCORDING TO ANALYSTS, BEHESTI'S ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY, WHICH REPORTEDLY HAS THE SUPPORT OF KHOMEINI AND THE POWER HE REPPESENTS, IS ANOTHER PRIME GROUPING. WHILE THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE A POLITICAL PARTY ALONG WESTERN LINES, IT IS A POLITICAL ENTITY WHICH FUNCTIONS THROUGH THE CLERICAL APPARATUS WHILE DISSATISFACTION WITH KHOMEINI MAY BE GROWING, WE SEE THIS GROUP AS THE ONE STILL ABLE TO ORGANIZE THE MASSES OF SOUTH TEHRAN AND GET THEM OUT ON THE STREETS. THE THIRD MAJOR GROUP THAT CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED IS THE NATIONAL FRONT, DESPITE ITS CURRENT WEAKNESS. ALTHOUGH SANJABI MAY BE WORKING HARD TO RESURRECT IT, WE CANNOT PREDICT ITS FUTURE BUT IT STILL HAS THE POTENTIAL TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE. WITH THE SHAH OUT OF THE GAME, THE NF WOULD PROBABLY HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME REUNITING ITS FORMER DIVERSE ELEMENTS INTO ONE ORGANIZATION (E.G. NIT 10,601).

8. OTHER INFORMATION INDICATES THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT, UNDER LATIER HEDAYOTOLLAH MATIN-DAFTARI, IS APPEALING TO SECULAR PROGRESSIVES, LIBERALS, AND LEFT OF CENTER INDIVIDUALS. ON ANOTHER PLANE, IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT THE LARGER TRIBAL GROUPING WILL TRY TO INFLUENCE ANY OUTCOME BY SUPPORTING PARTY MOST LIKELY TO IMPLEMENT THEIR DESIRES FOR AUTONOMY.

9. SMALL RADICAL GROUPS, OTHER THAN THE CHARIKS, FORMING UNDER VARIOUS NAMES, BUT DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY, ALSO ARE APPEAR-

PAGE 3 DIRECTOR 445413 S E C R E T
ING. FURTHERMORE, WE MUST NOT FORGET AYATOLLAH TALEGANI AND HIS
LARGE FOLLOWING OF MUJAHEDDIN. AT THIS POINT, POTENTIAL OF THESE
GROUPS APPEARS TO BE PRIMARILY DISRUPTIVE.

10. FOREGOING DESCRIPTION, VAGUE AS IT IS, BRIEFLY REPRESENTS
POLITICAL SCENE AS WE SEE IT. WE MUST HAVE CLEARER UNDERSTANDING
OF FORCES AT WORK, EXACTLY WHERE SM FITS IN AND HIS POTENTIAL
FOR SUCCESS BEFORE WE CAN COMMIT OURSELVES TO SPECIFIC POLITICAL
ACTION. OBVIOUSLY AT PRESENT WE DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION
TO MAKE THIS JUDGMENT. STATION HAS MADE EXCELLENT PROGRESS TOWARD
THIS GOAL BUT MORE IS NEEDED. FIRST WE MUST BE SURE THAT WE NOT
MISREADING SIGNALS AND THAT SM DOES WANT CONTACT. PERHAPS ONE
TIME DIRECT MEETING WITH HIM MAY BE CALLED FOR WITH SUBSEQUENT,
INDIRECT CHANNEL. OTHER METHODS OF ESTABLISHING THE LINK ARE
PROBLEMATICAL. WE ACCEPT STATION'S RESERVATIONS RE BURROWS WITHOUT,
HOWEVER, DISMISSING HIM AS POTENTIAL CHANNEL BUT STILL HOLD OUR OWN
RESERVATIONS REGARDING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF A CHANNEL TO NVBLAZON
ARRANGED BY A FORMER SDJANUS OFFICIAL. WE REALIZE THE DIFFICULTY
STATION HAS IN DEALING WITH SDJANUS/13 VIA IMPERSONAL COMMO BUT
REQUEST YOU CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

A. DOES SM KNOW THAT J/13 IS WORKING FOR HIM?
B. DOES SM RECOGNIZE J/13 AS A FORMER SDJANUS OFFICIAL?
IF HE IS NOT AWARE OF J/13'S BACKGROUND, HOW WOULD HE REACT IF HE
WERE TO LEARN IT FROM SOMEONE ELSE?
C. WOULD SM ACCEPT J/13, OR SOMEONE CLOSE TO J/13, AS
A CUTOUT TO US? BELEIVE WE SHOULD POINT OUT TO J/13 THAT THESE
POINTS CAUSE US A PROBLEM. AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR
TO J/13 THAT PERTINENT INTELLIGENCE ON THE POLITICAL SCENE MUST
COME BEFORE ANY PROMISES OF SUPPORT.

11. RECALL THAT, AROUND DECEMBER/JANUARY, TDY EMBASSY
POLITICAL OFFICER DAVE PATTERSON HAD MET WITH SM, WHO APPARENTLY
PLEASED AT EMBASSY CONTACT. HAS EMBASSY HAD MORE RECENT DIRECT
CONTACTS WITH SM? YOU MAY WISH DISCUSS WITH CHARGE POINTING OUT
THAT, ALTHOUGH OVERT EMBASSY CONTACTS NORMAL IN PRE-KHOMEINI PERIOD
CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES DICTATE MORE DISCRETION AND, RATHER THAN LOSE
EMBASSY CONTACT WITH SM ENTIRELY, STATION UNIQUELY EQUIPPED CON-
TINUE RELATIONSHIP WITH SM FOR PURPOSE OF INTEL COLLECTION. IN
ANY CASE, STATION MAY BE ABLE EXPLOIT SOME ELEMENT OF PATTERSON
BT
#5971

PAGE 4 DIRECTOR 445413 S E C R E T
CHANNEL AND SUGGEST YOU EXPLORE THIS POSSIBILITY AS POTENTIAL THIRD
ALTERNATIVE FOR ESTABLISHING INDIRECT CONTACT.

12. YOU WILL ALSO HAVE NOTED SCWASHINGTON 31806 POSSIBILITY.

13. IN SUMMARY, WE STILL SKEPTICAL THAT SDJANUS/13 OFFERS
MEANS OF ESTABLISHING INITIAL CONTACT WITH SM. HOWEVER, IF
HAVING CONSIDERED ABOVE, STATION STILL BELIEVES HE REPRESENTS
OF AVAILABLE OPTIONS, CONCUR WITH YOUR DISCUSSING WITH J/13
QUESTION OF COVERT CONTACT WITH SM FOR PURPOSE OF OBTAINING IN-
FORMATION DISCUSSED ABOVE.

14. WILL ADDRESS TEHRAN 53166, WHICH FIRST RECEIVED, SEPARATEL

15. FILE: 201-960845. RVW 22 MAY99 DRV DOC.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
#5972

S E C R E T 29121IZ MAY 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 53254 (GLEGOROFF ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR

WINTEL RYBAT SDVALID

REF: TEHRAN 53206

1. SDVALID/1 RETURNED FROM QOM AFTER BEING SUCCESSFU
MEETING AGAIN WITH SHARIATMADARI (SM) THE MORNING OF 26 MAY.

2. THE FOLLOWING IS AN ACCOUNT OF THAT MEETING. SEPA
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BROADER QUESTION OF INVOLVEMENT IN POL
CALL ACTION TO SUPPORT SM AND CERTAIN IRANIAN MODERATE GROUPS
FOLLOW SEPARATELY.

3. V/I REPORTED THAT ON ARRIVAL AT SM'S HOME, HE NOTI
THE PRESENCE OF MANY ARMED AZERBAIJANI TRIBESMEN, BOTH ON THE
GROUNDS AND INSIDE THE HOUSE. V/I SAID THIS WAS NEW: THERE
HADN'T BEEN ANY GUARDS AT THE TIME OF HIS LAST VISIT 30 APRIL,
AND IT DOUBTLESS IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE RASH OF ATTACKS ON
LEADING RELIGIOUS FIGURES.

4. V/I SAID THAT SM'S PRIMARY ASSISTANT HAD TAKEN
WORD TO SM THAT V/I WAS THERE TO SEE HIM AND AGAIN, RATHER SUR
PRISINGLY, SM INVITED V/I IN IMMEDIATELY. AFTER PRELIMINARIES
SEATING IN THE SALON AMONG OTHER CALLERS, V/I WHISPERED TO SM
THAT HE HAD SOMETHING CONFIDENTIAL TO TELL HIM. SM REPORTEDLY
LEANED OVER TO PERMIT V/I TO WHISPER IN HIS EAR. AND V/I RELAT
THAT AFTER THEIR LAST MEETING HE HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH "THE
AMERICAN FRIENDS". THE FRIENDS HAD AGAIN EXPRESSED THEIR ESTE
FOR SM AND THEIR AWARENESS OF WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO DO IN THE
IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE. SM THEN MENTIONED THAT THE POLITICAL
PARTY HE BACKS NEEDED HELP; IT HAS ABOUT TWO MILLION MEMBERS
BUT THERE IS MUCH TO BE DONE. V/I SAID THAT THE AMERICAN FRIE
MIGHT LIKE TO DISCUSS THESE THINGS, AND WAS THERE SOMEBODY WHO
NAME V/I COULD GIVE THEM IN THIS REGARD? SM THEN SAID THEY CA
TALK WITH THE LEADERS OF OUR PARTY. SM INVITED V/I TO JOIN.

SAYING THAT THE PARTY NEEDS MORE EDUCATED PEOPLE WITH POLITICAL
SOPHISTICATION. V/I SAID HE INTENDED TO JOIN (AT OUR INSTRUCTION
HE NOW WILLD BUT HE FRANKLY THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE
THESE CONTACTS WITH THE FRIENDS HANDLED BY SOMEONE SM TRUSTS
COMPLETELY AND WHO WOULD BE SURE TO KEEP THESE MATTERS CONFIDENT
SM SEEMED TO AGREE, AND GAVE V/I THE NAME AND ADDRESS IN QOM OF
HIS SON-IN-LAW HASSAN SHARIATMADARI. HE TOLD V/I TO MAKE ANY OF
THE FRIENDS TO HASSAN. IN V/I'S OPINION, SM KNEW EXACTLY WHAT
KIND OF POTENTIAL LINK HE WAS SETTING UP, AND KNOWS WELL THAT
THE AMERICAN FRIENDS ARE THE USG. V/I THANKED SM FOR TAKING
THE TIME TO RECEIVE HIM, AND AGAIN WAS TOLD HE WAS WELCOME TO
COME BACK AT ANY TIME. SHORTLY BEFORE EXCUSING HIMSELF, V/I
ASKED SM IF HE COULD ASK FOR HIS OPINION ABOUT SOMEONE, AN
OPINION WHICH THE AMERICAN FRIENDS HAD REQUESTED. SM AGREED.
WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY IN INTEL FORMAT. MEETING SM LASTED
ABOUT 30 MINUTES.

5. V/I THEN CALLED ON HASSAN AND SPENT ABOUT 15 MINUTES
WITH HIM, EXPLAINING WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED WITH HIS FATHER. DURING
THE COURSE OF THIS, HASSAN GAVE V/I HIS TEHRAN ADDRESS AND PHONE
NUMBER AND INVITED V/I TO CALL ON HIM WHEN READY. WE HAVEN OR WITHOUT HIS "FRIENDS" TO CONTACT
FOR THE FILE. HASSAN IS BETWEEN 30-35 YEARS OLD. V/I IS NOT
SURE WHETHER HE SPEAKS ENGLISH.

6. AT 28 MAY MEETING WHEN ABOVE INFO ACQUIRED, GLEGOROFF
TOLD V/I TO GO AHEAD AND CALL HASSAN BUT TO COME UP WITH SOME
PRETEXT FOR SLOWING THINGS DOWN FOR A SHORT WHILE. V/I PLANS
TO CONTACT HASSAN 29 OR 30 MAY. TELL HIM THAT PRESSING PERSONAL
BUSINESS WILL PREVENT HIM FROM MOVING FORWARD ON THE MEETING
INVOLVING "FRIENDS" FOR ANOTHER WEEK OR SO, BUT THAT HASSAN CAN
BE ASSURED V/I WILL BE BACK IN TOUCH AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.
MEANTIME, V/I WILL JOIN THE PARTY.

7. IT APPEARS THAT V/I HAS DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB OF GETTING
US AN INDEPENDENT, DISCREET AND SEEMINGLY VERY RELIABLE CHANNEL
INTO SM.

8. FILE: 201-859[illegible], 201-940840. RW 29 MAY 79 DRV DD C.I.

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





3005531 MAY 79 STAFF

5325/1 (ALEGGORFF/ACTING)

TOR.

YEAT

A. DIRECTOR 436211
B. DIRECTOR 437267
C. DIRECTOR 445413
D. TEHRAN 5325A
E. TEHRAN 5327AB

1. REFS D AND E REPORT MOST

/SDJANUS/13 (AND SDVALID/1 TO

DARY AND THEREBY OPEN POSSIB

DERATE RELIGIOUS LEADER AND

BEEN BRIEFED ON THESE EASES

2. AS HOS POINTS O

UNKNOWN ABOUT THE OVERALL

US MUCH COMFORT AS WE

THERE ARE NEW PARTIES AND

TEHRAN ALONE. SOME OF

ZATIONS, BUT INSTEAD

FOR THE PREVAILING

PHERE. IT IS INDEED

AS WHAT WE WANT IT TO

THERE. PARTICULARLY

STRUMENT FOR AFFECTING

3. SITUATION

SM'S PARTY, OR ANY

VELOP OPTIONS TO SU

ROTTER/A TO SUPPORT

ARE PROPOSING THAT

SM'S SON, HASSAN,

TRYING TO DO VIA

USING W/I ASSUN

DEVELOPMENTS IN EFFORTS

ELL TO SHAH IAT-

SUPPORT TO THIS

CHANGE HAS

MENTS. I CAN

IS STILL TOO MUCH

ON IN IRAN TO ALLOW

FLUENCE THAT SITUATION.

MED ALMOST DAILY IN

INDEPENDENT ORGANI-

ORMED TO SHOW SUPPORT

THIS KIND OF AN ATMOS-

WHAT THE REAL SITUATION

TO GET FROM HERE TO

MAY NOT BE A VALID IN-

PROPOSING THAT WE SUPPORT

RE, WE SHOULD WORK TO DE-

OR TO WORK THROUGH SD-

PARTY. IF WE CHOOSE, WE

THE GAME BY WORKING THROUGH

INFORMATION. JUST AS WE ARE

WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH HASS

ECESSARY. REQ HAS CONCURRENC



TEHRAN 5325/1 S E C R E T

2. WE PREFER THIS CHANNEL TO THE ONE WH
AND HIS FRIENDS IN THE MUSLIM PEOPLE'S REPU
PROPOSE NOT TO MEET HASSAN UNTIL AFTER
THE RESULTS OF HIS GROUP'S TRIP
CONTROL THE OVERALL EFFORT AND CAN
WAY NOT TO CONFUSE THINGS.

5. MEETING WITH HASSAN DOES NOT
PROVIDING SUPPORT TO OTHERS LATER, IF
OK UPON THE COOPERATION WITH SMS AS BEING
FLUENCING THIS MOVEMENT, TO WHATEVER
HE KIND OF INFORMATION WHICH
ARE PARTICIPATING ACTIVELY IN
BE IMPORTANT NOT TO ALLOW OURSELVES
OF MAKING THE DECISIONS FOR THE

6. IF THE FIRST ONE OR TWO
PROVE FRUITFUL. IT
OUTSIDE OF IRAN.
SECURITY PERTAINING AT THE

7.

S E C R E T

FILE: 29A/9 0845 0

MA 79 DRV 79 C 1.



R R T 062112Z JUN 79 STATE

DIRECTOR 452647.

PRIORITY TEHRAN.

INTEL RIGHT SDVALID

REFS, A. TEHRAN 53095
B. TEHRAN 53239
C. TEHRAN 53254
D. AM EMBASSY TEHRAN 05287

1. AS RESULT OF RAPIDLY UNFOLDING DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO SHARIAT-MADARI'S (SM) WILLINGNESS TO ESTABLISH CONTACT VIA SON HASSAN, MEETING WAS CONVENED AMONG INTERESTED HQS PARTIES ON 1 JUNE TO DETERMINE DIRECTION IN WHICH WE SHOULD MOVE. CONSENSUS WAS THAT WE STILL DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH INTELLIGENCE TO MAKE A PROPER JUDGMENT ON THE FUTURE COURSE OF POLITICAL ACTION IN IRAN AND ON THE LIMITED INFORMATION AVAILABLE. IN ADDITION WE RISK LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE SITUATION TO OUR ASSETS WHO MAY HAVE THEIR OWN POLITICAL INTERESTS AND GOALS. ALTHOUGH OUR OWN INTERESTS GENERALLY COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF SDJANUS/15, SDVALID/1, AND SDROTTER/4, THEIR VIEWS ON THE WAY TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS AND THE SPEED WITH WHICH WE SHOULD MOVE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY AT VARIANCE WITH OURS.

2. CONCUR WITH STATION MEETING WITH SM'S SON HASSAN. HOWEVER, REQUEST GLEGOROFF LIMIT HIMSELF TO ACTING OUT ROLE OF POLITICAL OFFICER INTERESTED IN MEETING ONE OF IRAN'S LEADING PERSONALITIES, AND WHO, TO PROTECT SM'S REPUTATION AND POLITICAL FUTURE, INSISTS THAT CONTACT BE HANDLED DISCREETLY. NO SUPPORT OF ANY TYPE SHOULD BE IMPLIED OR DISCUSSED AT THIS POINT. ALTHOUGH IF THE SUBJECT IS RAISED BY HASSAN, NEITHER IS IT NECESSARY TO STATE THAT NONE IS POSSIBLE IN FUTURE. SOLE PURPOSE OF CONTACT TO ASSESS HASSAN AS POTENTIAL REPORTING ASSET, PUTTING RELATIONSHIP ON CLANDESTINE BASIS, AND CREATING OPTION OF POSSIBLY SUPPORTING SM AT SOME FUTURE TIME. NO TRACES ON HASSAN. ALSO NOTE EMBASSY'S CONTACTS WITH SM SUPPORTER PER REF D. ASSUME STATION COORDINATE



PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 452647 S E C R E T
POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH DOIM SO WE DO NOT CROSS WIRES WITH EMBASSY ACTIVITIES.

3. DEFER TO STATION RE PARA 4 REF C. HOWEVER, BELIEVE IT BEST WE DISENGAGE FROM J/13 SM CHANNEL AS QUICKLY AND GRACEFULLY AS POSSIBLE. WE CERTAINLY DESIRE TO KEEP J/13 AS A REPORTING ASSET ON THE POLITICAL AND INTEL SERVICE SCENE, BUT HE SEEMS TO HAVE DISSEMINATED KNOWLEDGE OF AMERICAN CONNECTION UNNECESSARILY AND BELIEVE HIS BACKGROUND POSES TOO GREAT A RISK AS A POLITICAL CHANNEL.

4. WITH REGARD TO SDROTTER/4 (REF A), WE HAVE HIGH INTEREST IN MONITORING HIS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND ANY RESULTING INTEL. WE CONCUR IN CONCEPT OF MEDEA PROPOSAL AS ONE PLANNED TO HELP BRING TOGETHER PRO-US MODERATES FROM THE RELIGIOUS, SECULAR, POLITICAL AND MILITARY SPHERES. WE WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ARTICLES FOR HIS NEWSPAPER IF/WHEN IT IS ESTABLISHED. UNDER APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE COULD CONSIDER PROVIDING EXPERTISE IF REQUIRED.

5. WE NEED EXPANDED REPORTING CAPABILITIES IN ORDER TO DEVELOP A TERM UNDERSTANDING OF THE DEALING POWER GROUPS IN IRAN AND FROM THAT TO PROVIDE POLICY MAKERS WITH A BETTER APPRECIATION OF WHERE OUR INTERESTS LIE AND WHAT ACTION OPTIONS ARE REALISTIC. ONLY UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES COULD WE ANTICIPATE BROADENED POLITICAL ACTION TASKINGS. IDEALLY, WE WOULD HAVE REPORTING ASSETS IN THE OTHER MAJOR CENTERS OF THE COUNTRY, ADDITIONAL TRIBAL AND MILITARY COVERAGE, ASSETS IN THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND OTHER POWER GROUPS. WHILE THIS ADMITTEDLY IS A LONG TERM PROGRAM, SOME ASSETS ARE ALREADY IN PLACE WHO CAN BE TASKED TO PROVIDE POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE ARE AWARE OF THE INCREASED BURDEN ON A TWO MAN STATION AND WILL CONTINUE TO SPOT POTENTIAL ASSETS AS BEST WE CAN FROM BACK HERE TO SUPPLEMENT TEHRAN'S EFFORTS.

[illegible] FILE: 201-960843. RVW 5 JUNE 99 DRV DOC-1 ALL SECRET.

[illegible]
BT
#3

S E C R E T 07 222Z JUN 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 3376 (GLEGGOROFF ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT

REF: A. TEHRAN 5324B
B. TEHRAN 5325
C. DIRECTOR 151769

SVSD P.R.

1. TELEPHONE CONSULT WITH SD JANUS/IS TOOK PLACE JUNE [illegible] SCHEDULED. JANUS SOMEWHAT SHEEPISHLY ADMITTED THAT [illegible] CONFUSION WITH HIS SON HE HAD REFLECTED HIS OWN FORGETFUL[illegible] APOLOGIZED FOR ANY CONFUSION.

2. J/I3 REPORTED THAT MORTEZA-MOSSAVI HAD [illegible] MET PRIVATELY WITH SHARIATMADARI (CSM) IN PURSUANCE [illegible] REF A. J/I3 HAD NOT BEEN INVITED ALONG. A DECISION [illegible] REPORTEDLY ALSO REGARDED AS WISE.

3. J/I3 SAID SM HAD "FULLY AGREED" WITH THE [illegible] WHICH MORTEZA-MOSSAVI AND OTHER LEADERS OF MUSLIM PE[illegible] CAN PARTY HAD MADE TO HIM THAT CONTACT WITH THE AMER[illegible] BE MADE TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OF SUPPORT FROM USG. [illegible] UNDERSTANDS THAT THIS PEOPLE PUT OUT TENTATIVE FEELER[illegible] AND NOT VICE-VERSA. ACCORDING TO J/I3 SM SAID HE HAD [illegible] CONDITIONS TO HIS AGREEMENT. FIRST, THE CONTACTS SHOULD BE VERY FEW AND VERY SECRET. SECOND, THEY SHOULD BE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND EQUALITY. WHEN GLEGGOROFF PRESSED J/I3 FOR MORE THOROUGH EXPLANATION OF THIS, HE SAID SM MEANT THAT USG SHOULD BE NO SUPERIOR-INFERIOR RELATIONSHIP; TWO EQUALS COULD COME TO AGREEMENT. SM SAID HE PROMISED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IN RETURN TO REPAY ANY MONEY WHICH USG WOULD BE ASKED TO PROVIDE.

4. SM REPORTEDLY INSTRUCTED MORTEZA-MOSSAVI TO [illegible] AMERICANS REALIZED THAT THE $5 MILLION SUPPORT FIGURE WAS FIGURE J/I3 PREVIOUSLY CONVEYED TO US WOULD ONLY COVER [illegible] SAID ORGANIZING WOULD BE COSTLY AND OVERALL NEED FOR [illegible]

BE MANY TIMES THE $5 MILLION AMOUNT. SM DID NOT [illegible] WOULD BE RELIED UPON FOR ALL, BUT HE SUGGESTED [illegible] BE BORNE BY US.

5. J/I3 SAID MORTEZA-MOSSAVI RETURNED FROM [illegible] A SENSE OF URGENCY FOR THIS MATTER. SM THINKS [illegible] TO BEGIN ORGANIZING SERIOUSLY. HE WANTS TO [illegible] EMPHASIS ON AZERBAIJAN, SO AS TO LOCK UP HIS [illegible] GEE GOING IN OTHER KEY (BUT UNNAMED) PROVINCE. [illegible] EMPHASIZE THE PROVINCES, AND HE TOLD MORTEZA-[illegible] BY STARTING NOW HE CAN REACH HIS OBJECTIVES.

6. IN TERMS OF MECHANICS, SM SAID HE PERSONALLY [illegible] FOR SECURITY REASONS TO MEET WITH ANY FOREIGN OFFICIALS [illegible] SAID HE HAD REJECTED ATTEMPTS BY BRITISH AMBASSADOR [illegible] MEET HIM IN GOM. KNEW BRIT WAS TRYING TO SEE [illegible] HE WOULD AGREE TO SEE EMISSARY FROM USG IF PROPER [illegible] ARRANGED. J/I3 HAD NO SUGGESTIONS AS TO WHO [illegible] MIGHT BE OTHER THAN MORTEZA-MOSSAVI, WHO SPEAKS [illegible] TO KNOW OF THE ARRANGEMENT, NOT EVEN HIS SON.

7. J/I3 SAID SM HAD ALSO SAID HE HOPED [illegible] LEAD TO HIS BECOMING BETTER INFORMED ON CURRENT [illegible] RECALL THIS WAS THE REGRAIN WHICH HAD BEEN [illegible] FRANK BURROWS AFTER LATER'S MEETING WITH SM). J/I3 [illegible] CONCLUDED ABOUT THE LATEST ROW WITH WASHINGTON [illegible] NOMINATION. HE NEEDS TO BE "INFORMED" SO HIS [illegible] BE HELPFUL. HE'S ALSO CURIOUS WHETHER THERE IS [illegible] GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WE TRUST.

8. AT CLOSE OF CONVERSATION WITH GLEGGOROFF, J/I3 [illegible] THAT SM HIMSELF WANTED TO KNOW ON AN URGENT BASIS WHETHER [illegible] WANTED TO SUPPORT HIM OR NOT. WHEN GLEGGOROFF EXPLAINED [illegible] SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS USUALLY REQUIRE SOME DEBATE AND [illegible] J/I3 WAS DISAPPOINTED. HE HOPED HE'D BE ABLE GET AN ANSWER [illegible] WEEKEND. J/I3 EMPHASIZED THAT SM WANTED TO GET [illegible] AND NEEDED TO KNOW WHETHER HE COULD COUNT ON U.S. SUPPORT [illegible]

9. WE HAVE ANOTHER PHONE CONTACT WITH J/I3 [illegible] FOR



56

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PAGE 2 TEHRAN 55398 S E C R E T INTEREST THAT SM SHOULD F

SHOULD REALIZE IT MUCH IN OUR INTEREST THAT CHALLENGE KHOMEINI

ENOUGH TO COME OUT WITH VIEWS

3. J/13 THEN INQUIRED ABOUT OUR WILLINGNESS TO

OF THE TRUTH OF SITUATIONS AFFECTING IRANIAN-AMERICAN

(PARA 7 REF). GLEGOROFF SAID HE WOULD BE PLEASED TO SH

FACTS WITH SM BUT THAT AGAIN, THE MODALITIES WERE LONG

BEING WORKED OUT. IN COURSE OF GIVING J/13 A BRIEF

AS WE SEE IT, GLEGOROFF MENTIONED POSSIBILITY THAT IRAN

MENT MIGHT BE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN BREAKING DIP

WOULD BE ALL THE MORE NECESSARY NOT TO GIVE THEM PRET

SO, SUCH AS ACCUSATION INVOLVEMENT WITH SM. J/13 SAID

PASS THIS MESSAGE.

4. IN ORDER TO KEEP J/13 CHANNEL TO SM ALIVE, FOR

LONGER, WE TOLD J/13 WE WOULD HAVE SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT

POLITICAL SITUATION FOR HIM TO PASS ON TO MORTEZA-MUSSA

GLEGOROFF TOLD J/13 WE WERE STILL WAITING FOR MOS INPUT

PHONE CON WITH J/13 SCHEDULED FOR 16 JUNE, AT WHICH TIME

ON SOME MORE QUERIES.

5. ASKED J/13 ABOUT HIS OWN SITUATION. HE SAYS

HOLDING AND WAITING, BUT IN ABSENCE OF LOCK-SOLID GUARA

HE IS NOT GOING BACK TO WORK. J/13 SAID HE MANAGING OK

NOT NEED ANY HELP FROM US.

6. STATION WILL PROVIDE FURTHER COMMENTS AND REC

SEPARATELY.

7. FILE 201-14926 ; 201-96884. RVN 10JUN79 DRV D

ALL SECRET

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 1010182 JUN 79 STAFF

SITE TEHRAN 55398 (GLEGOROFF ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINIEL RYBAT SDVALID

REFS: A. TEHRAN 55376

B. DIRECTOR 462647

1. GLEGOROFF MET HASSAN S H A R I A T M A D A R I A

LATTER'S TEHRAN HOME MORNING 10 JUNE. SDVALID/1 MADE THE IN

DUCTION (GLEGOROFF WAS "MR. FRANK") AND AT HASSAN'S REQUEST

TO ACT AS INTERPRETER. HASSAN UNDERSTANDS ENGLISH WELL ENOUGH

IS RELUCTANT TO SPEAK IT. MEETING LASTED 40 MINUTES, AND WAS

CORDIAL.

2. PER PRIOR AGREEMENT, W/I EXPLAINED TO HASSAN THAT

HAD BEEN GIVEN GLEGOROFF'S NAME AS THE PROPER U.S. EMBASSY O

TO CONTACT BY W/I'S AMERICAN FRIENDS. GLEGOROFF IS POLITI

OFFICER IN EMBASSY. LATTER WANTED MEETING TO BE HELD IN VER

DISCREET WAY SO AS TO PROTECT INTERESTS OF BOTH. HASSAN ASKED

QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS. HE SAID HE WELCOMED CHANCE TO MEET AND

DISCUSS POLITICAL MATTERS WITH GLEGOROFF AND, AT CLOSE, SAID

PLEASED TO SEE YOU AGAIN." AS REGARDS W/I, HASSAN NOW LOOKS

TO BEGIN ORGANIZING THE U.S. (WASHINGTON) BRANCH OF THE MUST

PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY (MPRP) AMONG IRANIANS THERE. HOS

WANT TO TALK FURTHER WITH W/I ABOUT THIS DURING HIS STAY TH

3. FORMAT FOR MEETING WAS PRIMARILY QUESTION AND ANS

OBJECTIVES WERE TO MEASURE HASSAN'S WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS

SITUATION OPENLY, ASSESS HIS ATTRACTIVENESS AS OPS CANDIDATE

TO COMPARE THE SUBSTANCE AND THRUST OF THIS MEETING WITH

WE ARE GETTING SEPARATELY VIA SDJANUS/13. WE DID NOT

ANY INTEL BREAKTHROUGHS AND THERE WERE NONE.

HASSAN SAID HE SPENDS FOUR DAYS PER WEEK IN TEHRAN

ON MPRP ACTIVITIES, AND THE OTHER THREE IN QOM. HE SAYS

DEFENSIVELY, THAT THE PARTY HAS NO "BIG NAMES" (HOJJAT

PAGE 2 TEHRAN 53398 S E C R E T

NAME LEADERS) AND HE SAYS THERE IS NO REAL ATTEMPT A COOPER
AT THIS TIME WITH OTHER IRANIAN POLITICAL PARTIES. E JOKED
SO MANY PARTIES NOW BEING FORMED AND SO FEW TAKEN E IOUSLY
IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO BE OUT SEEKING ALLIANCES. E THE
NATIONAL FRONT WAS HAVING PROBLEMS MERELY IN GETTI S OLDER
TO JELL. HASSAN BELIEVES IT TOO MUCH TO EXPECT HI ARTY TO
AN IRAN-WIDE ORGANIZATION, BUT BY CONCENTRATING ON RTAI R
PARTICULARLY AZERBAIJAN, AN EFFECTIVE PARTY COULD BUIL
THOUGHT THERE WAS A TIME-FUSE ON THIS, SINCE IT WA IN THE G
MENT'S HAND TO DECLARE ELECTIONS (TO THE MAJLIS) WE EVER IT
AFTER THE CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN APPROVED.

5. HE SEES HIS JOB AS GETTING THE PARTY REA TO CONTE
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. THE PARTY HAS NOT PROGRE D TO TH
OF ENDORSING CANDIDATES FOR OFFICE; ORGANIZING IS H NAME O
GAME FOR NOW.

5. HASSAN DECLINED TO SPECULATE ON THE ROLE F THE M
FEDAYIN OR REVOLUTIONARY GUARD IN ELECTION ORGANIZ WITH
TO THE DEMANDS OF THE KURDS AND PERHAPS OTHER NATIO MINO
FOR REGIONAL AUTONOMY, HASSAN EXPLAINED THAT THE PRO PECT OF
UPRISINGS IN SUPPORT OF AUTONOMY WOULD BE A FACTOR THE GO
MENT'S FOREIGN POLICY. HE THOUGHT EXTERNAL FORCES RE ARG
BEHIND THOSE MOVEMENTS, AND IF THE GOVERNMENT WERE LE TO
SUADE THESE FOREIGN BACKERS TO CEASE, THE PROBLEMS ULD GO

6. WHEN THE RATHER STIFF QUESTION-AND-ANSWER STRUCTUR
SESSION BEGAN TO LOOSEN, HASSAN ASKED FOR THE REAL ORY BEH
CUTLER INCIDENT. GLEGORCFF SAID THE OFFICIAL VERSI WAS TH
CUTLER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH MOBUTU IN ZAIRE SUGGESTED TO THIS
GOVERNMENT THAT HE WAS USED TO A DIFFERENT KIND OF RELATIONS
THAN THAT THE PGOI WOULD WANT HIM TO HAVE HERE. O GUESS IS
REAL REASON FOR OPPOSITION TO CUTLER STEMMED FROM REACTION H
TO U.S. SENATE RESOLUTION CRITICAL OF IRAN. HASSA ASKED WH
WE THOUGHT YAZDI OR KHOMEINI REALLY BEHIND CUTLER DECISION.
SAID "KHOMEINI". HASSAN NODDED. IN ORDER TO SUGG POSSIB
THAT CERTAIN CONFIDENTIAL INFO MIGHT BE EXCHANGED TH HASSA
WE INQUIRED WHETHER HE HAD HEARD THAT ENTEZAM WOULD BE LE
HASSAN SAID HE HAD NOT, AND ASKED A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS ABOU

7. WHEN MEETING ENDED, THERE WAS FRIENDLY SHAKING OF H
AND PRO-FORMA "PERHAPS" "HOPE TO SEE YOU AGAIN", BU CERTAINL NO
INDICATION FROM HASSAN THAT HE SEIZED OF FUTURE POSSIBILITIES F
CONTACT WITH AMERICANS. HIS REMARKS AND OBSERVATIONS WERE AL VE
DISPASSIONATE AND POLITE AND OF BOILER-PLATE VARIET. HASSAN
SEEMED QUITE CAUTIOUS, PERHAPS NATURALLY SO FOR FIRST MEETING AN
HAD NO APPARENT OBJECTIVES TO ACHIEVE HIMSELF. HAS ANOTH
MEETING WITH HASSAN 12 JUNE, WHICH SET UP TO DISCUSS FURTHER
WHAT WE IS TO DO FOR THE PARTY IN THE U.S. HAVE LD WA TO BE
ALERT FOR ANY FEEDBACK ON 10 JUNE MEETING WHICH HASSAN MAY G
AT THAT TIME.

8. FILE: 201-960841 ; 201-959511. RVW 10 J 99 RV

ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

25 Jul 79 3 49z

S E C R E T 250126Z JUL 79 INTEL

CITE DIRECTOR 482081.

TO: TEHRAN INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KABUL, KARACHI, KUWAIT, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.

WNINTEL INTEL
FOLLOWING IS TDFIRDB-315/13092-79 FOR DISSEM PER FIELD DISSEM LINE.

TDFIRDB-315/13092-79
DIST: 24 JULY 1979

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED IN FINAL PARAGRAPH

COUNTRY: IRAN
SUBJECT: ALLEGED EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES AND PLANS OF SHARIAT MADARI-BACKED POLITICAL GROUP (DOI: JULY 1979)
SOURCE : AN IRANIAN BUSINESS EXECUTIVE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM A SOURCE WITH GOOD ACCESS.

1. A PROMINENT BAZAARI (MERCHANT), ALI E S L A M I, A WELL-TO-DO, "OLD SCHOOL" BUSINESSMAN WITH BUSINESS INTERESTS IN THE AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY FIELD, IS CURRENTLY A CLOSE CONFIDANT AND POLITICAL DEMONSTRATION/MARCH ORGANIZER FOR AYATOLLAH SEYED KAZEM S H A R I A T - M A D A R I. ESLAMI CLAIMS THAT HE HAS SOME THIRTY THOUSAND PEOPLE PREPARED TO MARCH AND DEMONSTRATE AGAINST AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH K H O M E I N I IN THE SOUTH TEHRAN AREA. ESLAMI CLAIMED TO BE ABLE TO MOBILIZE THE DEMONSTRATORS ON TWO HOURS NOTICE. JAILED FOR THREE MONTHS BY THE COMMITTEES, HE CLAIMED HE HAD BRIBED HIS WAY TO FREEDOM. HE STATED HE ORGANIZED THE DEMONSTRATORS IN THE ONE AND ONE. HALF MONTHS FOLLOWING HIS INCARCERATION.

2. ESLAMI ALLEGED TWO INSTANCES IN WHICH HIS UNITS HAVE ACTED AGAINST KHOMEINI. THE FIRST WAS AN ATTACK ON THE KHOMEINI RESIDENCE APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS AGO INVOLVING THE USE OF A HAND GRENADE. THE PURPOSE WAS TO PROVE TO THE POPULATION IN GENERAL THAT THERE WERE EXISTING CAPABLE FORCES OPPOSED TO KHOMEINI.

3. THE SECOND INCIDENT WAS TO SEND APPROXIMATELY 1,000 IRANIAN WOMEN TO QOM TO OBTAIN THE RETURN OF THEIR PERSONAL JEWELRY WHICH THEY HAD DONATED TO KHOMEINI'S MOVEMENT SHORTLY AFTER THE SHAH WAS DEPOSED. THE INTENTION OF THIS GESTURE WAS TO DEMONSTRATE LACK OF FAITH IN AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S CURRENT GOVERNMENT.

4. ACCORDING TO ESLAMI, THE TIME IS PARTICULARLY RIPE TO MOVE AGAINST KHOMEINI BUT THERE IS NO POLITICAL LEADER OR "DICTATOR" TO

FILL THE POWER VACUUM. THE CONSENSUS AT THIS TIME AMONG THE GROUP IS THAT ANY STRONG MAN THEY SELECT MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH UNITED STATES AND SOVIET INTERESTS AND IT IS FELT THAT NO PERSON OTHER THAN THE SHAH CAN MEET THIS REQUIREMENT. ESLAMI FURTHER STATED THAT HIS GROUP PLANNED TO DISPOSE OF AYATOLLAH SADEQ K H A L K H A L I, IF HE WERE NOT DEAD ALREADY.

5. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: FOR FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING ESLAMI'S RELATIONSHIP WITH SHARIAT-MADARI, SEE TEHRAN EMBASSY TELEGRAM 1586 DATED 1 JUNE 1979.)

6. ACQ: (19 JULY 1979)

7. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO TEHRAN, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KABUL, KARACHI, KUWAIT, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV, (CHIEFS OF MISSION ONLY)

8. WASHINGTON DISSEM:
TO STATE: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, INR
REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW 24JUL99 DRV D9C.1 BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.
BT
#0009

19 Jul 79

S E C R E T 190857Z JUL 79 STAFF

DTG: TEHRAN 53713

TO: DIRECTOR

WNINTEL SD JANIS ORBOLSTER

REF: A. TEHRAN 53696 (NOT-10,661)
B. DIRECTOR 41697
C. DIRECTOR 43939

1. EOS HAD TWO HOUR MEETING 16 JULY WITH SD JANIS AND (FNU) MOUSAVI. AS ANTICIPATED, THEY REPROACHED US FOR INDECISION REGARDING SUPPORT FOR SHARIATMADARI, AND EXHORTED US TO GET OFF THE DIME. WE DISCUSSED THE BACKGROUND TO THEIR REQUEST FOR SUPPORT, AND JANIS RENEWED HIS RECOMMENDATION THAT REACTION REPRESENTATIVE TALK DIRECTLY TO SHARIATMADARI, REPORTED SEPARATELY.

2. BOTH JANIS AND MOUSAVI--ESPECIALLY THE LATTER--WERE PLAINLY EXPECTING SOME POSITIVE WORD REGARDING SUPPORT TO SHARIATMADARI, AND JANIS THOUGHT WE MUST BE FULLY INFORMED ON THE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORTS BEING CONDUCTED BY MUSTAFA CHAMRAN. OUR OBJECTIVE FOR THE MEETING THUS BECAME TO LOWER EXPECTATIONS WHILE PRESERVING THEIR DISPOSITION TO COOPERATE.

3. EVEN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT OUR INABILITY TO PROVIDE MATERIAL SUPPORT MAY HAVE INHIBITED THEM FROM SHARING EVERYTHING THEY KNOW, WE WERE LEFT WITH IMPRESSION THAT NOT EVEN MOUSAVI, THE ACTUAL CONTACT MAN, KNOWS VERY MUCH ABOUT S-M'S ORGANIZATION OR PROGRAM. HE DESCRIBED S-M'S OBJECTIVES IN FLAG AND MOTHERHOOD TERMS. THEN, WHEN PRESSED A LITTLE, SAID S-M AND HIS PARTY CONSIDER ALL THE "FOREIGNERS" BROUGHT BACK TO RUN THE GOVERNMENT--HE LISTED YAZDI, ENTEZAM, AND GHOTBZADEH AS EXAMPLES. LATER, MOUSAVI REPEATED THIS, DESCRIBING IT AS AN OPINION OF HIS OWN WHICH HE THINKS S-M SHARES. WE WANTED TO KNOW HOW OUR HELP, IF FORTHCOMING, WOULD BE USED, AND WERE TOLD THAT PARTY'S NEEDS NO LONGER THE SAME AS WHEN SUBJECT FIRST RAISED. ORIGINALLY, ACCORDING TO MOUSAVI, S-M'S DISTRESS AT ARBITRARY KOMITEH VIOLENCE HAD LED HIM

PAGE 2 TEHRAN 5371 S E C R E T

TO PROPOSE ARMING [illegible],000 AZERBAIJANIS IN TEHRAN TO OVERTHROW KO
RULE; HE WOULD HAVE USED OUR MONEY TO BUY THE GUNS. THE SITUAT
IS NOW LESS EXTREME AND MOUSAVI WAS ABLE TO TELL US THAT S+M
LONGER PROPOSES SUCH AN EXTREME SOLUTION; WE WERE UNABLE TO LEA
WHAT IN FACT HE DOES PROPOSE TO DO. FOR THE RECORD, WE WERE TO
IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE PARTY'S FINANCIAL NEED IS LESS PRESSIN
THAN WHEN AID WAS FIRST REQUESTED.

4. MOUSAVI SAID THAT RAHMATOLLAH MOGADAM-I MARAGHEH
IN FULL COOPERATION WITH S+M, BUT WAS UNABLE EXPLAIN TACTICAL D
TEGIC PURPOSE OF BACK ORGANIZING HIS OWN PARTY. IN RESPONSE TO
ABOUT S+M'S ALLEGED TIES WITH MILITARY, ETHNIC, AND RELIGIOUS FIG
MOUSAVI SAID THERE ARE TIES TO MUJAHEDIN-E-KHALQ, BUT URGED
US APPROACH S+M DIRECTLY FOR DETAILS. (HERE, AS ELSEWHERE, WE
GOT IMPRESSION THAT MOUSAVI, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS HAVING INFORMATI
NOT PERMITTED TO SHARE, WAS NOT IN FACT WELL INFORMED.)

5. BOTH MOUSAVI AND J/13 KEPT PUSHING THE DESIRABILITY
DIRECT CONTACT WITH S+M. TO OUR QUESTION ABOUT RISK TO S+M PO
BY CONTACT WITH AN OFFICIAL AMERICAN, THEY RESPONDED BY SUGGESTIN
VISIT BY OFFICER UNDER JOURNALISTIC COVER. LEAVING ASIDE THE
POSSIBLE PROBLEMS OF COVER MECHANICS, WE THINK THE IDEA WORTH
EXPLORING. A ONE-SHOT BUT THOROUGH ELICITATION SESSION CONDUC
BY A FARSI-SPEAKING OPERATIONAL VETERAN (ADLESICK?) WOULD, IF
MOUSAVI IS RIGHT ABOUT S+M'S DISPOSITION TO DEAL DIRECTLY, PRO
DUCE A QUANTUM JUMP IN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THIS KEY LEADER AN
ORGANIZATION AND ALLIANCES.

6. MAIN POSSIBLE DRAWBACK IS ONE DISCUSSED AT HQS REP
PAOWIN DEPARTURE: IT IS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE J/13-MOUSAVI
BOND SPEAKS AUTHORITATIVELY WHEN IT PURPORTS TO SPEAK FOR S+M
AND THE PAUCITY OF FACTUAL INFORMATION ELICITED AT OUR 16 JULY
MEETING IS NOT REASSURING. ANOTHER POTENTIAL PROBLEM IS THE
PERSIAN DEPENDENCY SYNDROME: THEIR NEED TO GET A SIGN FROM EI
BROTHER IS SO URGENT THAT THEY (J/13 AND MOUSAVI, AT LEAST, IF NOT S+M HIMSELF) MIGHT INTERPRET OUR AGREEMENT TO
DIRECT CONTACT AS AN IMPLIED COMMITMENT OF SUPPORT, OUR DISCL
NOT WITHSTANDING.

7. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, WE MAY BE UNDERESTIMATING T

PAGE 3 TEHRAN 5371 S E C R E T
ON J/13 AND MOUSAVI [illegible] OF FIRST MEETING WITH A STRANGER REA
NEWS; THEY MAY BE [illegible] INFORMED, AND BY EXTENSION MORE TH
TIVE REPRESENTATIVES OF S+M, THAN THEY APPEARED. WE THI
THAT, IF S+M'S INTEREST IS DEFINITELY ESTABLISHED, WE CO
CAREFUL PREPARATION TO MINIMIZE THE RISK THAT DIRECT CONTAC
CREATE INFLATED EXPECTATIONS FOR 28 JULY AND NEXT MEETING WITH J/13 BE
BEFORE WE SEE HIM. WOULD WELCOME HQS VIEWS, EVEN IF JEN

8. PLS PROVIDE AVAILABLE BACKGROUND ON MOUSAVI.

9. HAVE JUST SEEN FBIS LONDON TRANSLATION OF USE
INTERVIEW WITH S+M PUBLISHED 17 JULY. RECOMMEND IT TO Y
ATTENTION.

10. FILE: 201-149066; 201-960845. RVW 19 JUL 99

ALL SECRET
SECRET

S E C R E T ...327Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 53.59

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDJANUS QRBOLSTER

REF TEHRAN 53..3

1. MEETING WITH SDJANUS (J/13) AND MOUSAVI HELD ..... AUGUST. NEITHER HAD INFORMATION OF ANY SUBSTANCE TO CONVEY. MAIN AGENDA .... WAS THEIR PROPOSAL RE CONTACT WITH SHARIAT-MADARI (S-M).

2. J/13 WANTED TO KNOW HQS REACTION TO HIS PITCH FOR DIRECT CONTACT WITH S-M. WE SAID HQS RECOGNIZES ADVANTAGES OF DIRECT CONTACT, BUT THERE IS PROBLEM FINDING SOMEONE (1) WHO HAS FLUENT FARSI .... (2) WHOME TRAVEL HERE NOT PROHIBITED BY ASSOCIATION WITH SDJANUS. J/13 ACCEPTED THIS, AND SUGGESTED IF NO ONE CAN BE FOUND TO COME HERE, WE COULD DEAL WITH AYATOLLAH FNU ZANJANI WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS S-M'S ALTER EGO, AND AS ALREADY WITTING OF J/13'S INTERMEDIARY ROLE BETWEEN US AND ..... J/13 SAID THAT ZANJANI DOES NOT SPEAK ENGLISH. BUT THAT HIS SON FARID WHO NOW IN TEHRAN, COULD BE USED AS INTERPRETER.ACCORDING J/13, FARID LIVES IN NEW YORK; HIS ADDRESS WAS GIVEN ONE OF PAQUIN'S PREDECESSORS DURING EARLY DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT.

3. STATION FILES CONTAIN NOTHING ON ZANJANI, AND WE .... HQS FORWARD BACKGROUND INFO. FYI: POLITICAL COUNSELOR IS FAMILIAR WITH ZANJANI AS LONGTIME ASSOCIATE OF BAZARGAN. BUT .... UNABLE CONFIRM ALLEGED CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH S-M.

4. TIME DID NOT PERMIT THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF THE .... AND WE .... ANY CASE PREFERRED TO DEFER FURTHER ..... PENDING RECIEPT OF HQS INFO ON THE SUBJECT. QUESTIONS ..... ANSWERS ....

A. DOES ZANJANI ACTUALLY HAVE THE RELATIONSHIP WITH

..... BY J/13?

B. IF HE DOES, WILL HE GIVE US THE ..... ON ORGANIZATION AND PLANS WHICH WE UNABLE TO GET FROM ..... AND MOUSAVI?

C. ARE THERE REAL SECURITY ADVANTAGES TO DEALING WITH ZANJANI INSTEAD OF DIRECTLY WITH S-M?

D. HQS HAS NOT YET COMMENTED ON J/13'S PROPOSAL ..... PARA FIVE REF. WE STILL BELIEVE IT MERITS CONSIDERATION, ... ONE-SHOT EXERCISE, IF WE CAN SATISFY OURSELVES ..... S-M REALLY WANTED IT. REQUEST HQS VIEWS ON THIS ACCOMPA..... ... REQUEST INFO PER PARA FOUR ABOVE.

6. NEXT MEETING WITH J/13 SCHEDULED FOR 7 AUGUST.

7. FILE: ZOI-149066. RVW 7 AUG 99 DRV D9C. ALL SECRET S E C R E T

14 AUG 79 07 07Z

S E C R E T 142115Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 434196.

TO: TEHRAN

INTEL/SOJANUS/GOELSTER

REF: TEHRAN 53859

1. TEHRAN 52969, 7 MAY 79, REQUESTED TRACES ON SAID FARID WHO IN PUBLISHING BUSINESS IN N.J. DIRECTOR 436211, 11 MAY 79, REPORTED THAT ONE MOHAMMED SAID FARID WHO WAS STUDENT AT NYU IN 1965 AND ACTIVE IN TUDEH WAS SUBJECT 201-778091. TEHRAN 53859, 11 MAY 1979, REPORTED BACK THAT FARID WAS SON OF AYATOLLAH SANJANI ZANJANI. HQS HAS REVIEWED 201-778091 AND RUN TRACES ON AYATOLLAH ZANJANI, RESULTS OF WHICH FOLLOW.

2. SUBJECT 201-778091, MOHAMMED SAID FARID, WAS REPORTED IN JUNE 65 AS PART TIME STUDENT NYU AND ACTIVE IN TUDEH. DPOB: 30 JULY 1936 (OR 1932), ZANJAN, IRAN. EMPLOYED LANA KNITWEAR INC., UPPER MONTCLAIR, N.J. IN 1967, ADDR: 380 UPPER RIVER DRIVE, APT 4H, PASSAIC, N.J. ONE M. (SAID FARID WAS LISTED AS VP IN CHARGE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OF ISA OF THE U.S. (ISAUS) AS OF SEPT 1966. PER NITA-15130, 21 JUN 1965, M. SAID FARID, REGISTERED AS PART TIME STUDENT AT NMU, AND FATHER AYATOLLAH SEYED FARID HAVE RECORD OF TUDEH ACTIVITY IN IRAN. STATE DEPT INFO 7 OCT 67 REPORTED MOHAMMED SAID FARID, DPOB AS STATED ABOVE, ARRIVED U.S. 1959, APPLIED FOR PRA DEC 65, EMPLOYED LANA KNITWEAR, RESIDENCE PASSAIC, AS STATED ABOVE. FULL NAME WAS GIVEN AS MOHAMMED-SAID FARID ZANJANI. NITA 1521, 15 SEP 67, WHICH REPORTED ON 14TH ANNUAL ISA CONGRESS STATED MOHAMMED S. FARID AS VP OF SAN (SIC) AND LEADER OF SPLINTER GROUP OF N.Y. CHAPTER WHICH FORMER N.Y. CHAPTER I PASSAIC.

3. AYATOLLAH HAJ AGHA REZA ZANJANI AKA REZA ZANJANI AKA MULLAH SEYED REZA ZANJANI IS SUBJECT 201-149266, WAS ENCRYPTED IDEN A DOB CIRCA 1905. LONG-TIME AND CLOSE FRIEND OF FORMER TEHRAN ASSET SDROPE/1 WHO KEPT STATION ADVISED OF HIS ACTIVITIES. SDROPE/1 WAS SOMETIMES RELUCTANT TO CONTACT ZANJANI BECAUSE OF

SAVAK. ZANJANI RETAINED A SPORADIC WATCH ON HIM (ZANJANI) BY SAVAK, INCLUDING THE DISSIDENT WIDE CIRCLE OF CONTACTS THROUGHOUT IRAN INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT, POLITICS AND PROMINENT NON-MEMBERS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT. ZANJANI INCLUDING THE BAZAAR. WAS STRONGLY ANTI-GOVERNMENT. HAD BEEN APPOINTED WITH BAGER KAZEMI AND BAKHTIAR BY DR. MOHAMMED MOSADEGH TO A THREE-MAN EXECUTIVE COUNCIL TO OVERSEE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NEW THIRD NATIONAL FRONT WHICH WAS BEING FORMED BY KAZEMI ON MOSADEGH'S INSTRUCTIONS. NITA-19130, 21 JUNE 1965, REPORTED THAT STATION CONTACT JALAL MAZDI ENCRYPTED IDEN B. 201-778012, ENGINEER IN NIOC INTRODUCED STATION OFFICER MADENSKY TO HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW WHO WAS SON OF AYATOLLAH ZANJANI. BROTHER-IN-LAW S. RAHIM FARID WAS IRANIAN U.S. CIT AND MARRIED TO U.S. CIT, FOUR CHILDREN, STUDIED SETON HALL UNIVERSITY, N.Y. ADDR: P.O. BOX 108, BRAZIL, INDIANA. M.D. (GENERAL SURGEON) WAS ASSIGNED 201-778094. HIS YOUNGER BROTHER WAS SAID FARID, DPOB CA 1932, STUDENT NYU WHO WAS ASSIGNED 201-778091. TEHRAN 5259, 29 SEP 56, REPORTED OFFICIALS OF SYRIAN LEGATION TEHRAN WERE IN TOUCH WITH NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (NRM) THRU SEYED REZA ZANJANI. NRM PASSING TO SYRIANS MATERIAL RE IRANIAN PUBLIC ATTITUDE ON SUEZ FOR BROADCAST ON RADIO CAIRO.

4. FILE REVIEW DOES NOT SUBSTANTIATE ALLEGATION THAT ZANJANI CLOSE TO SHARIATMADARI, BUT OF COURSE NEITHER DOES THIS EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY. SINCE THERE IS APPARENT LANGUAGE INCOMPATIBILITY WITH ZANJANI AND IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DEAL THROUGH SON FARID, MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON DURATION FARID'S STAY IN TEHRAN AND STATION'S ASSESSMENT HIS SUITABILITY/RELIABILITY. ON BALANCE WOS DISINCLINED PURSUE THIS LEAD.

5. COMMENTS ON OTHER ASPECTS FOLLOW SEPARATELY.

6. FILE: 201-149266, 201-778091, 201-196864 RVW 13AUG99

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SECRET

S E C R E T 2812Ø8Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54Ø5Ø

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL INTEL

REF: TEHRAN 54Ø51 (NIT-1Ø,7ØØ)

1. REF INFO OBTAINED BY SDJANUS/13 FROM MOUSAVI.MOUSAVI WAS PRESENT, WITH J/13 INTERPRETING, AND WE WERE ABLE TO CLARIFY SEVERAL POINTS WHICH OBSCURE IN J/13'S INTIAL PRESENTATION. WE ASKED MOUSAVI IF HE HAD ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION DIRECTLY FROM SHARIAT-MADARI: HE WOULD NOT COMMIT HIMSELF.

2. NO FILE. RVW 28 AUG 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

C R E T 061909Z SEP 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR 5Ø8589.

TEHRAN.

TEL SDJANUS

TEHRAN 54113
TEHRAN 54057
DIRECTOR 494190

AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO MEETING WITH ZANJANI FOR PURPOSES
GATHERING INTELLIGENCE ON MPRP AND SHARIAT-MADARI (S-M) IN-
TIONS. WITH SDJANUS/13 (J/13) ACTING AS INTERPRETER. ZANJANI
N SHOULD BE KEPT OUT OF PICTURE. PAQUIN SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO
ANJANI MEETING IS FOR INFORMATION GATHERING PURPOSES AND NO
MMITMENTS, SUPPORT OR OTHERWISE, SHOULD BE READ INTO IT.

WILL BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING IF S-M IS AWARE OF MEETING
T IF ZANJANI PURPORTS TO BE ACTING AS HIS SPOKESMAN. EXPECT
ITING WILL IMPROVE J/13 OWN POSITION WITH S-M FORCES AND HOPE-
GIVE HIM GREATER ACCESS TO MPRP INFORMATION, AS WELL AS
OW HIM THAT HIS EFFORTS HAVE HAD SOME EFFECT WITH US.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE FURTHER INFO ON MEETING ARRANGEMENTS
ND COVER ROLE STATION OFFICER INTENDS PLAY. PLS CLARIFY WHETHER
QUSAVI HAS BEEN TOLD THAT PAQUIN'S ATTACTION OFFICER.

FILE: 201-149068. RVW 6SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#3089

15 SEP 79 0 4 2Z

E C R E T 131600Z SEP 79 STAFF

ITE FR/PHILADELPHIA 11926

O: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

NINTEL AJAJA FORRES TRACE SDBEEP

EF: DIRECTOR 510725 (NOT SENT TEHRAN)

1. AT 11 SEPT MEETING, NEW ASSET SDBEEP/1 (B/1) (IDEN FOR
EHRAN) GAVE PHILADELPHIA BASE OFFICER RENSKLEY, IN
OLLOWING POSSIBLE OPS LEAD:

NAME: ALI AKBAR S H A H L A (SUBJ)
DPOB: CA 1919; TABRIZ, IRAN
CIT: IRAN
OCC: MANAGER FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIAN STATE-
GLASSWARE SUBSIDIARY LOCATED IN
TEHRAN.
ADD: BAZAAR, TEHRAN

2. SUBJ, A LONGTIME PERSONAL FRIEND OF B/1,
COUSIN AND CONFIDANT OF AYATOLLAH KAZEM S H A R I
/1 TOLD RENSKLEY THAT HE KNEW SUBJ AND SHARIAT-
EGULARLY EVERY FRIDAY WHEN B/1 WAS IN IRAN. (B/1
5 JAN 79.) ACCORDING TO B/1, SUBJ HAS ALWAYS BE
N KEEPING WITH SHARIAT'S PHILOSOPHY THAT
EADERS (AND THEIR FAMILIES) SHOULD ATTEND MOSQU
ANAGE AFFAIRS OF STATE. NEVERTHELESS, SUBJ IS
O SHARIAT-MADARI THROUGH SUBJ'S SILENT
ZERBAIJANI COMMUNITY IN TEHRAN.
ELIGIOUS AND STRONG NATIONALIST. HE WAS EDUCATED
S MARRIED WITH AT LEAST ONE DAUGHTER WHO WAS B/1'S
ECRETARY IN TEHRAN. SUBJ SPEAKS FARSI AND TURKISH
RAVELLED INFREQUENTLY ON BUSINESS TRIPS TO GERMANY AND
ZECHOSLOVAKIA AND IS STILL FREE TO TRAVEL OUTSIDE IRAN FOR
LAUSIBLE REASONS (AND BECAUSE OF HIS FAMILIAL TIES TO SHARIAT-
ADARI).

5. B/1 TOLD RENSKLEY THAT HE IS WILLING TO USE HIS "CLAN-

PAGE 2 FR/PHILADELPHIA 11926 S E C R E T
DESTINE TELEPHONIC CHANNEL TO TRY ARRANGE MEETING WITH SUBJ
IN EUROPE ON BEHALF OF RTACTION AT A FUTURE DATE. B/1 VOLUNTEERED
TO ATTEMPT CONTACT SUBJ WHILE B/1 IS IN LONDON AND PARIS LATER
THIS MONTH TO DETERMINE SUBJ'S PLANS TO VISIT EUROPE THIS YEAR.
B/1 ALSO VOLUNTEERED TO INTRODUCE RTACTION OFFICER (IN NVBLAZON
LIS) IF SUBJ DOES MEET B/1. B/1 STATED EMPHATICALLY THAT SUBJ
IS SHARIAT-MADARI'S MOST TRUSTED FRIEND AND, THEREFORE, SUBJ
HAS EXCELLENT ACCESS TO AND INFLUENCE WITH SHARIAT-MADARI.
B/1 WAS EQUALLY PERSUASIVE IN TELLING RENSKLEY THAT HE COULD
EASILY REQUEST A MEETING WITH SUBJ OUTSIDE IRAN AND THAT SUBJ
WOULD RESPOND FAVORABLY TO THIS INVITATION. B/1 SAID HE IS
SURE THAT SUBJ WOULD CONSULT WITH SHARIAT-MADARI BEFORE ACCEPTIN
B/1'S INVITATION AND THAT SHARIAT-MADARI WOULD GIVE HIS APPROVAL

6. B/1 ALSO HAS HAD LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH AYATOLLAH
SHARIAT-MADARI DUE TO B/1'S PROMINENT FAMILY STATUS AND FINANCIAL
RESOURCES. B/1 SAID HIS LAST PERSONAL MEETING WITH SHARIAT-
MADARI TOOK PLACE CIRCA 1977 IN QUM DURING EARLY STAGES OF
ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN. B/1'S LAST COMMUNICATION WITH
SHARIAT-MADARI ARRIVED CLANDESTINELY IN IRANIAN NEWSPAPERS ON
MARCH 79. B/1 WAS ACCUSED OF PERFORMING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY
ACTIVITIES IN LONDON. B/1 SAID AT THAT TIME HE USED HIS
CLANDESTINE TELEPHONIC CHANNEL TO TELL SHARIAT-MADARI THAT THE
ACCUSATIONS WERE FALSE. SHARIAT-MADARI, USING SAME CHANNEL,
SENT MESSGE TO B/1 SAYING THAT HE SHOULD CONTINUE HIS MEDICATIO
IN THE UNITED STATES AND WHEN THE TIME IS RIGHT, I SHALL ASK
YOU TO RETURN (TO IRAN). B/1 TOLD RENSKLEY THAT SUBJ WAS
INSTRUMENTAL IN THESE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN B/1 AND SHARIAT-
MADARI.

7. B/1 TOLD RENSKLEY THAT HIS FATHER AND SHARIAT-MADARI
WERE GOOD FRIENDS. B/1 WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN COMPLTING WITH HIS
FATHER'S DYING WISH TO CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF B/1'S
FAMILY WEALTH TO SHARIAT-MADARI IN 1975. B/1 SAID THAT HE ALSO
MADE ANOTHER SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION IN 1975 AS A TITHE ON THE
DEATH OF B/1'S SON (IN AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT OUTSIDE SAN
FRANCISCO). FOR THESE REASONS, B/1 SAID HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH
SHARIAT-MADARI AND SUBJ WILL REMAIN STRONG AND HE WOULD NOT
HESITATE TO RETURN TO IRAN IF SHARIAT-MADARI ASKED HIM TO DO SO
AND GUARANTEED HIS SAFETY.



PAGE 3 FR/PHILADELPHIA 11926 S E C R E T

6. ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON B/1-RENSKLET 11 SEPT MEETING
BEING FORWARDED BY TELEPOUCH. REF REQUIREMENTS FOR U E WIT
B/1 ARRIVED TOO LATE FOR 1 SEPT MEETING AND WILL BE ASSED
AT NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED O/A 24 SEPT IMMEDIATELY PRI R TO
B/1'S PLANNED TRAVEL TO EUROPE.

7. FOR HQS: QUERY IF CUMMINSKY AVAILABLE 24 SEPT FOR
PLANNED MEETING WITH B/1 AND RENSKLEY IN PHILADELPHIA HOTEL
ROOM, STARTING 1200 HOURS.

8. FILE: 201-961587. RVW 13 SEP 99 DRV D9C1.

S E C R E T
BT
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

E C R E T 131600Z SEP 79 TAF

TE FR/PHILADELPHIA 11926

TEHRAN.

NTEL AJAIA FORBES TRACE

: FR/PHILADELPHIA 11926

LDEN ; MANOTTCHER NIKPOUR

13 SEP 99 DRV D9C1.

S E C R E T

T

S E C R E T 191345Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 316332

TO: FR/PHILADELPHIA INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA FORRES SDBEEP

REF: FR/PHILADELPHIA 11926

1. APPRECIATE REF INFO ON SDBEEP/1 (B/IY LINES TO [redacted] MADARI (S-M). FOR PRESENT WISH TAKE NO ACTION ON CONTACT [redacted] B/1 FRIEND BUT WE SHOULD REMAIN WILLING LISTEN TO WHAT B/1 [redacted] WILLING PASS ALONG RE S-M. FYI, TEHRAN STATION HAS BEEN IN [redacted] FACT FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS WITH FOLLOWERS OF S-M WHO HAVE [redacted] PUT REACTION IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH S-M. AS YET, BECAUSE OF [redacted] INHERENT SECURITY AND POLICY PROBLEMS, WE HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED A DIRECT CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION WITH HIM. IN FACT WE ARE NOT COMPLETELY SATISFIED HE ACTUALLY WANTS A DIRECT LINK WITH US. TEHRAN STATION IS MOVING TO DETERMINE THIS.

2. CUMMISKY WILL PLAN TRAVEL PHILADELPHIA FOR REF MEETING [redacted] SEPT VIA METROLINER DEPARTING WASHINGTON 0600 AND ARRIVING [redacted] AFTER 1000. REQUEST RENSKEY MEET AT 30TH STREET STATION SHORTLY [redacted] IS AVAILABLE DISCUSS CASE PRIOR TO MEETING. CUMMISKY IS [redacted] INCHES, 150 POUNDS, LIGHT BROWN HAIR, WILL BE [redacted] PLAID SUIT.

3. [redacted] TRACES SUBJ REF.

[redacted] FILE 201-261567. RVW 18SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T 191238Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 34251

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL ORBOLSTER SDJANUS

REF: DIRECTOR 308379

1. HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO ACT ON HQS APPROVAL OF MEETING [redacted] ZANJANI BECAUSE OF SDJANUS/13 UNAVAILABILITY. HAVE BEEN CALLING [redacted] HIM, PER HIS INSTRUCTION, AT HOUSE OF HIS FRENCH-SPEAKING FRIEND, BUT HE NEVER THERE WHEN CALLED, AND FRIEND HAS SAID ONLY THAT HE THOUGHT J/13 CONSIDERING A TRIP.

2. AT OUR LAST SESSION, WE GAVE J/13 NUMBER OF STATION DIRECT LINE; HE HAS NOT USED IT.

3. WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO REACH J/13, AND WILL ADVISE RESULTS.

4. FILE: 201-1[redacted]. RVW 19 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

[redacted]

[redacted] SIGNALLED OUR DESIRE FOR A MEETING. SAW HIM AND MOUSAVI [redacted] SEPTEMBER. J/13 SAID HIS UNAVAILABILITY DUE TO MAJOR BACK [redacted] SURGERY UNDERGONE BY HIS DAUGHTER IN PASADENA; HE HAD BEEN SCRATCHING [redacted] AROUND TRYING TO GET PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY TO VISIT HER. [redacted] HIS REQUEST IS NOW IN CHAMRAN'S HANDS FOR TRANSMITTAL TO PRIME [redacted] MINISTER. MEANWHILE, J/13 ASKS THAT WE CHECK ON DAUGHTER'S [redacted] CONDITION: HE SEEMS NOT SATISFIED WITH INFORMATION OBTAINED BY [redacted]. HE SAID CUMMISKEY CAN INQUIRE THROUGH J/13 SON. WILL [redacted] ASSOCIATE HQS CHECKING ON THIS. NEXT MEETING WITH J/13 [redacted] SCHEDULED FOR 4 OCTOBER.

[redacted]

3. AS MOUSAVI TELLS IT, ZANJANI HAS HIS OWN BASE OF [redacted] AMONG THE AZERBAIJANI TURKS (MAYBE THAT IS WHY S-M, DESCRIBING [redacted]

[redacted] (OR OTHER SELECTED SITE). WE HAVE ASKED MOUSAVI TO RECOMMEND [redacted] EVENING MEETING TO ZANJANI.

6. FILE: 201-149066. RVW 30 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
[redacted] SECRET

SECRET 091342Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54435

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDJANUS SDPROBE

REF: A. TEHRAN 54356
B. DIRECTOR 524423

1. HAVE NOT YET SEEN SDJANUS/13 (J/13) FOR MEETING INTENDED TO FINALIZE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SESSION WITH ZANJANI. WORKING THROUGH J/13'S FRENCH-SPEAKING FRIEND, WE ARRANGED FOR TWO-DAY POSTPONEMENT OF MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 4 OCTOBER; THIS DONE TO ACCOMMODATE A VISITOR ASSOCIATED WITH COS' COVER JOB. NEITHER J/13 NOR MOUSAVI APPEARED AT THE APPOINTED TIME, AND WE INFER THAT OUR INSTRUCTIONS WERE GARBLED BY THE INTERMEDIARY. LATTER DID NOT ANSWER HIS PHONE ON 7 OR 8 OCTOBER, AND J/13 HAS NOT TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF NUMBER GIVEN HIM SEVERAL WEEKS AGO.

2. AT LAST MEETING WITH SDPROBE/1, WE INQUIRED ABOUT ZANJANI'S PERSONAL CONSTITUENCY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH SHARIAT-MADARI. P/1 SAID THAT ZANJANI IS MORE POLITICAL THAN RELIGIOUS, AND HAS A MODEST FOLLOWING AMONG INTELLECTUALS. HE DESCRIBED ZANJANI'S INFLUENCE IN AZERBAIJAN AS NEGLIGIBLE. P/1 SAID THAT THERE IS CONTACT BETWEEN ZANJANI AND SHARIAT-MADARI, AND THAT HE SAW ZANJANI AT A MEETING WITH SHARIAT-MADARI WHEN THE LATTER STOPPED IN TEHRAN AFTER RAMADAN ON HIS WAY FROM MASHAD TO QOM. P/1 DOES NOT VIEW THE RELATIONSHIP AS PARTICULARLY CLOSE.

3. WE WILL HAVE THE ABOVE IN MIND AS WE FORMULATE QUESTIONS FOR THE INTERVIEW WITH ZANJANI WHICH WE STILL HOPE TO ARRANGE. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

4. APPRECIATE REF B ASSISTANCE. WILL PASS THE WORD WHEN J/13 RESURFACES.

5. FILE: 201-237926. RVW 9 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
SECRET



54490

IRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDJANUS

REF: TEHRAN 54435

1. REACHED INTERMEDIARY (WHOM SDJANUS/13 HAS NOW DESCRIBED
THER-IN-LAW) AND SET UP MEETING WITH J/13 WHICH TOOK
14 OCT. HE SAID MOUSAVI HAD PROCEEDED TO QOM PER OUR
STANDING, GOT SHARIAT-MADARI BLESSING FOR THE MEETING WITH
ZANJANI, AND CARRIED THIS WORD TO ZANJANI
BEFORE OUR LAST MEETING WITH J
ADVISED ZANJANI THAT THEY OUGHT
HITCH IS THAT ZANJANI REFUSES TO
TO CALL ON KHOMEINI (WHICH HE HAS
LACKS PRETEXT TO VISIT TEHRAN.

2. HAVE NO PRESE
RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE CONT
MAN, OR WHETHER HE NOW
THE MEETING NEEDS WOR
SON-IN- NAZIH FAME), AND THAT S-M.
BEEN ADVISED OF HIS TRIP, WANTED TO SEE HIM.
EXPECTED TO SEE MOUSAVI MOMENTARILY
SOMETHING TO REPORT.

SECRET 161403Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54501

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDVALID INTEL

REF: TEHRAN 54500

1. ON SUNDAY, 15 OCTOBER, DURING TRIP TO CASPIAN AREA, SDVALID/1 (S/1) TOOK PART IN POLITICAL DISCUSSION WITH PROMINENT MEMBERS OF TURKOMAN TRIBES FROM GONBAD AREA. THESE TRIBESMEN ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND SAY THAT THEY WANT TO BEGIN ARMED OPPOSITION TO IT. THEY SAID, HOWEVER, THAT AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI HAS PASSED WORD TO THEM NOT TO START ARMED RESISTANCE YET. S/1 WAS VERY SURPRISED TO HEAR THESE DECLARATIONS THAT ONLY SHARIAT-MADARI'S RESTRAINT IS KEEPING THE TURKOMANS FROM FIGHTING AND WILL CHECK ON THIS WITH HASSAN SHARIAT-MADARI.

2. FILE: 201-959511. RVW 16 OCT 99 DRV DOC. 1. ALL SECRET.
SECRET

SDJANUS/13. MR. FARAZIAN. FORMER SENIOR SAVAK OFFICER (POSSIBLY BRIGADIER OR MAJOR GENERAL)
SPECIALTY: INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS.
OFFICE: 2ND OR THIRD FLOOR (LEFT SIDE OF STAIRS), IN OFFICE BUILDING JUST NORTH OF RUSSIAN DEPARTMENT STORE ON EX-NADER SHAH.
AGE: 50-55.
PURPOSE OF CONTACT: ① INFORMATION ON ORGANIZATION AND MISSION OF SAVAMA, TO WHICH MR. F WAS UNPAID (?) CONSULTANT; ② INFORMATION ON CLERICAL ROLE IN IRANIAN POLITICS.
MR. F. OFFERED TO ARRANGE A MEETING, THROUGH AN ASSOCIATE MR. MOUSAVI*, WITH AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI.
WASHINGTON THOUGHT ITS PURPOSE MIGHT BE MISUNDERSTOOD, AND DISAPPROVED.
MR. F., APPARENTLY AT MR. M. SUGGESTION PROPOSED AYATOLLAH ZANJANI AS BEING ALSO KNOWLEDGEABLE BUT NOT ASSOCIATED WITH A POLITICAL PARTY. WASHINGTON APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE. ZANJANI WAS TO BE ASKED TO DETERMINE IF S.M HAD ANY INFORMATION HE WANTED TO PASS.
AS OF 4 NOVEMBER, MEETING NOT YET ARRANGED.

1

SDJANUS/13.
MEANS OF CONTACT: MEETINGS ARRANGED BY PHONE CALL TO MR. F. AT OFFICE OR AT HOME OF RELATIVE (BROTHER-IN-LAW?). MEETINGS AT OFFICE.
RE ① ABOVE: INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED ON PLANS TO EMPLOY SOFORMER SAVAK OFFICERS WHO HAD WORKED AGAINST FOREIGN EMBASSIES, AND ON TARGETING OF SAVAMA ON COMMUNIST, WEST EUROPEAN, AND U.S. EMBASSIES.
PAYMENT: NONE.

*Mr. Mousavi is a layman, and a businessman (nature of the business not known). Age: 50-55. Has office in North Tehran. He is a supporter of Shariat-Madari, but whether he is directly connected with the Ayatollah is not known.

2

SDJANUS/13. Mr. Farazian.

Mr. F had official contact with the Station before the Revolution. After the Revolution, he remained in contact by telephone. First meeting with him was in late July or early August, in his office in the building just north of the Russian Department Store on ex-Nader Shah. At one of the early meetings, Mr. F brought along Mr. Mousavi, whom he described as a businessman.

Meetihgs were held on an irregular basis, on the average every three or four weeks.

Mr. F said that he was in touch with Mustafa Chamran, as an informal and unpaid consultant on the organization of SAVAMA. He said he attended some meetings of SAVAMA officials; he is believed to have been in contact with Mehdi Chamran, either in the context of such meetings or via individual appointments.

Mr. F reported the substance of one meeting, in which operational priorities were discussed. Most of the participants wanted to give top priority to the presumed intelligence activities of the Soviet Embassy, with second priority given to the U.S. Embassy. One participant argued that top priority be givn to the U.S. Embassy. Mr. F gave the name of this official, but it is not recalled.

In this same context, Mr. F described a proposal for SAVAMA to hire approximately 50 former SAVAK officers who had experience in counter-intelligence work against foreign embassies. This project underwent various changes: at first, they were to be employed part-time; then the whole thing was to be abandoned and all pensions canceled for former SAVAK officers; then, at least some of the original 50 were to be hired on a

full time basis.

Mr. Mousavi was introduced as a supporter, but not as a representative, of Shariat-Madari. (Mr. F said that Mousavi knew Paquin only as an Embassy officer.) Neither Mr. F nor Mousavi seemed well informed of S-M's views or of the organization and program of his political party, and offered to arrange a meeting between S-M and one of our officers on an "information only" basis. Washington disapproved this, on the ground that S-M might misunderstand our purposes, and because of difficulty of travel to Qom. Mr F and Mousavi then suggested that Ayatollah Zanjani could provide information on S-M's party, as well as any views that S-M wished to have conveyed. As of 4 November, it was understood that Mr. Mousavi was making arrangements for a meeting with Ayatollah Zanjani.

SDVALID/1.

In May or early June, Glegoroff had one meeting with Hassan, son of Ayatollah Shariat-Madari. Recollection is not certain on this point, but it is believed that SDVALID/1 arranged the meeting and served as interpreter. It is also believed that Hassan was not told that Glegoroff was anything other than a regular Embassy officer. (The other possibility is SDFORWARD/1. If, as believed, it was SDVALID/1, the latter subsequently made a trip to the U.S., from which he returned as previously noted.)

Real Name: Rahmatullah Muqadam Maraghei.

Code Name: S. D. Prob.

Muqadam Maraghei was an old friend of the C. I. A. station in Tehran since Aban 1332 (October 1953), and in Aban 1340 (October 1961) a letter of approval was issued to employ him for supplying political reports and also for launching secret hostile propaganda campaigns (against anti-American). The relevant document can be seen in the file containing documents about Shariat Madari. (document No. 12)

After Maraghei was appointed as the governer of Azarbaijan by the provisional government, the Americans decided to re-establish contacts with him via S. D. Prank. Apparently this idea could not be materialized untill Murdad 58 (August 1979), when Muqadam would have returned from Azarbaijan to Tehran. Then, Hasa Gawa, one of the C. I. A. agents posted in the Embassy of Japan would introduce him to the director of the C. I. A. station at Tehran for re-establishing contacts. After this introduction, their weekly meetings were held at the residence of Hasa Gawa.

In his reports Maraghei gave extensive information concerning the Iranian provisional government, government officials, events in Kurdistan, the Revolutionary Council, the Experts' Council and about his associations with the Radical Movement and Shariat Madari. To bring about an improvement in Irano-U. S. relations, in one of the meetings he suggests that one of the Americans should meet with the Imam, in a bid to open a channel of access between the diplomatic mission, or the Station and the other Ulema. Similarly, he consulted with the C. I. A. about plans for forming a political united front in association with his Radical Movement and other parties like the National Front and the Muslim People's Party of Shariat Madari.

Maraghei had (long term) associations with the Political section of the U. S. Embassy as well as the C. I. A. section. After re-establishing contacts with him in Mehr 58 (September 1979), the C. I. A., in order to save him from becoming conspicuous, asked the political section of the embassy to break relations with him, since his repeated visits would have increased the possibility of his becoming obvious, (the political section was apparently not aware of the problems and connections of the C. I. A.).



S E C R E T 011323Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 53825

TO: DIRECTOR INFO COPENHAGEN.

WNINTEL SDJAMUS SDPROBE SDPRANK SDPUTTY

REF: A. DIRECTOR 484635
B. TEHRAN 53670 (NOT SENT/NEEDED COPENHAGEN)

1. WE WONDER IF REF B MAY HAVE BEEN OVERLOOKED DURING PREPARATION OF REF A. ON 1 AUGUST, IDEN REF B REPEATED HIS INTENTION TO INTRODUCE COS TO MOGHADAM AS SOON AS LATTER RETUR FROM TRIP TO AZERBAIJAN. WE HAVE ALREADY ARRANGED A VISA PUSH FOR MOGHADAM'S SON, AND THIS SEEMS LIKELY TO PROVIDE BASIS FOR EFFORT TO BUILD PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP.

2. WHATEVER OTHER ANGLES HQS MAY WISH PURSUE, ASSUME YO WILL WANT US TO CONTINUE THIS LOCAL APPROACH.

3. IT IS CLEAR THAT IDEN REF B PERCEIVES HIMSELF TO BE COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH RTACTION. REQUEST ASSIGN 201 AND CRYPTONYM. ASSUME FAIRLY COMPLETE BIO AVAILABLE HQS.

4. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-237926, 201-105906, 201-229725.

WW 1 AUG 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
E C R E T

S E C R E T Ø912Ø6Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54167

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDPROBE INTEL

REF: TEHRAN 54166 (NIT-1Ø,72Ø)

1. SDPROBE/1 OBTAINED PARA ONE REF FROM SON OF SHARIATMADARI. HIS KURDISH SOURCES ARE NOT NAMED; THEY APPEAR TO BE CASUAL INFORMANTS, BUT WE NOT CERTAIN YET PRECISELY WHERE HE GETS HIS INFORMATION ON THAT SUBJECT.

2. NO FILE. RVW 9 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 211030Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 7425

TO: DIRECTOR

WHITEL WHITEL

1. SDPROBE/1 PROVIDED THESE FRAGMENTS ON 20 SEP 3053.734:

A. YAZDI, SABBAGHIAN, CHAMRAN, AND TABATABAI HAVE COMBINED TO IMPROVE THEIR COLLECTIVE POWER POSITION. THEIR INTENTION IS PRESUMABLY TO GUARANTEE THEIR PRESENCE IN POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. THIS COMBINATION HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF RUMOR, BUT THEIR IS ALSO SOME DEFINITE EVIDENCE WHICH PARTIALLY CONFIRM IT. (COMMENT: WE WERE UNABLE TO LEARN WHAT THIS EVIDENCE IS.)

B. TALEGANI MUST IN FACT HAVE BEEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH. THE OFFICIAL ANNUNCEM OF THIS WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE. (COMMENT: SDPROBE/1 ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAD NOT KNOWN, BEFORE TALEGANI'S DEATH, OF HIS PRESIDING OVER THE COUNCIL.)

C. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE A FAIRLY STABLE MEMBERSHIP, MEETS TWO, OFTEN THREE, TIMES A WEEK AT THE PARLIAMENT BUILDING. (COMMENT: SDPROBE/1'S IMPRESSION OF A STABLE MEMBERSHIP IS BASED, AS FAR AS WE COULD LEARN, ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT SOME WEEKS AGO OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEMBERS AS MINISTERIAL UNDERSECRETARIES, AND OF THE SIMULTANEOUS ELEVATION OF SEVERAL [illegible] MINISTERS TO COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP.)

2. NO FILE. RVW 21SEP99 DRV D.9C.1.

S E C R E T

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T -- WHINTEL - NOFORN -- NOCONTRAC

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: STATEMENTS OF AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI ABOUT HIS ULTIMATUM TO THE GOVERNMENT ON THE MAHABAD SIEGE, AN EMIGRE AND INTERNAL OPPOSITION POLITICS (DOI: LATE OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A LIBERAL POLITICIAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL CIRCLES. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION FROM A SOURCE WITH EXCELLENT ACCESS.

1. AYATOLLAH KAZEM S H A R I A T - M A D A R I SAID IN LATE OCTOBER 1979 THAT HE HAD INTERVENED TO BRING AN END TO THE GOVERNMENT SIEGE OF MAHABAD IN WEST AZARBAIJAN. HE SAID THAT HE HAD SENT AN EMISSARY TO INTERIOR MINISTER HASHEM S A B B A G H I A N, DEMANDING THAT THE SEIGE BE LIFTED. SHARIAT-MADARI SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED THE EMISSARY TO SAY THAT, IF THE SEIGE CONTINUED, HE WOULD MOBILIZE AZARBAIJANI TURKS TO LIFT IT BY FORCE. (SOURCE COMMENT: SHARIAT-MADARI DID NOT SAY WHEN THE ULTIMATUM HAD BEEN DELIVERED.) (FIELD COMMENT: SABBAGHIAN IS ONE OF THREE MEMBERS OF A GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE RECENTLY APPOINTED TO TRY TO DEVISE A SOLUTION TO THE KURDISH REBELLION. THE TEHRAN TIMES HAS REPORTED THAT THE SEIGE OF MAHABAD WAS CONTINUING ON 28 OCTOBER, BUT HAD BEEN PARTLY LIFTED ON 24 OCTOBER.)

2. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, SHARIAT-MADARI VIGOROUSLY DENIED ANY CONNECTION WITH EXILED FORMER PRIME MINISTER SHAHPOUR B A K H T I A R. HE SA[illegible] THAT BAKHTIAR HAD MADE ONE INITIATIVE TO ESTABLISH CONTACT, BUT TH[illegible] THERE IS NO COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THEM. SHARIAT-MADARI EXPLIC[illegible]Y DENIED THAT HE WAS MADE OR INTENDS TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENT TO SUPP[illegible] BAKHTIAR.

3. S[illegible]IAT-MADARI SAID THAT HE IS ADVISING THE MUSLIM PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC[illegible]TY (MPRP) TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION WITH AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH [illegible] M E H D I AND THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP. (SOURCE COMMENT: [illegible]IAT-MADARI WAS SPEAKING IN THE CONTEXT OF KHOMEINI'S DENUNCIATI[illegible] THE MPRP'S PUBLIC MEETING OF 19 OCTOBER, AT WHICH THERE WERE [illegible] FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS.) SHARIAT-MA[illegible] HE PERCEIVES KHOMEINI'S AUTHORITY TO BE DECLINING, AND THAT HE [illegible] WILL BECOME POSSIBLE, PERHAPS WITHIN TWO OR THREE MONTH[illegible]OSITION GROUPS TO VOICE THEIR CRITICISMS MORE FR[illegible]LY.



REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: COMMENTS OF MOQADDAM-MARAGHEH ON THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

SOURCE : A LIBERAL POLITICIAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENT CIRCLES. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM A SOURCE WITH EXCELLENT ACCESS.

1. IN EARLY OCTOBER 1979, ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS MEMBER RAHMATOLLAH M O Q A D D A M - M A R A G H E H DESCRIBED PLANS FOR A NEW POLITICAL FRONT GROUP TO BE COMPOSED OF HIS OWN RADICAL MOVEMENT, THE NATIONAL FRONT (NF), AND AYATOLLAH KAZEM S H A R I A T-M A D A R I'S MUSLIM PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY (MPRP). MOQADDAM SAID HE UNDERSTANDS THAT NF LEADER KARIM S A N J A B I WILL SHORTLY RETURN FROM THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID THAT THE FORMATION OF THE NEW FRONT MAY BE ANNOUNCED AS EARLY AS 13 OCTOBER, AT WHICH TIME THE NEW ORGANIZATION WILL BEGIN PREPARING FOR ELECTIONS TO THE NEW PARLIAMENT.

2. MOQADDAM SAID THAT, AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE RADICAL MOVEMENT IS LIKE OTHER IRANIAN POLITICAL GROUPS, IN THAT IT IS ESSENTIALLY THE PROJECTION OF A SINGLE PERSONALITY. THERE ARE NO MEMBERSHIP ROLLS, AND NO FORMAL ORGANIZING ACTIVITY. (SOURCE COMMENT: MOQADDAM IMPLIED THAT PREPARATION FOR THE ELECTIONS WILL REQUIRE A MORE SYSTEMATIC PROGRAM. HE DID NOT SAY WHETHER HE HAD DECIDED WHAT FORM THIS WILL TAKE.) (FIELD COMMENT: NIT-10,744 FROM THE SAME SOURCE, CONTAINED A SIMILAR STATUS OF THE MPRP.)

3. ACCORDING TO MOQADDAM, THE AUTHORITY OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IS GRADUALLY DECLINING, BUT THIS DECLINE BEGINS FROM A POSITION OF SUCH UNQUESTIONED PRE-EMINENCE THAT KHOMEINI CAN BE EXPECTED TO PRESERVE HIS CONTROL OVER THE GOVERNMENT FOR A PERIOD OF MONTHS, AT LEAST, AND PERHAPS MUCH LONGER. MOQADDAM SAID HE BELIEVES, NEVERTHELESS, THAT SOME OF THOSE LOYAL TO KHOMEINI SENSE THAT THE REVOLUTION IS IN TROUBLE, AND THAT THIS HAS GENERATED A SINGLE-MINDED DETERMINATION TO SOLIDIFY THEIR CONTROL

OVER SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT. MOQADDAM IDENTIFIED FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIM Y A Z D I AS ONE OF FIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO THINKS ARE LEADING THE CAMPAIGN TO CONSOLIDATE THE REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITY. MOQADDAM SAID THAT HE HAD KNOWN YAZDI BEFORE THE REVOLUTION AND REGARDED HIM AS BASICALLY MODERATE, EVEN PRO-WESTERN. NOW, HE SAID, IT SEEMS THAT YAZDI AND THE OTHERS IGNORING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUND PUBLIC POLICY AS THEY STRUGGLE TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POWER. MOQADDAM IDENTIFIED THE OTHERS IN THE GROUP AS DEFENSE MINISTER MUSTAFA C H A M R A N, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN SADEQ T A B A T A B A I, INTERIOR MINISTER HASHEM S A B A Q I A N, AND NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION DIRECTOR SADEQ G H O T B Z A D E H.

4. ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (7 OCTOBER 1979) FIELD REPORT NO. NIT-10,763.

5. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT TEHRAN (CHARGE ONLY). SENT TO AMMAN ..... MANAMA, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT Rreleasable TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW 9 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1 CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

S E C R E T 100704Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54438

TO: DIRECTOR.

WHINTEL EDPROBE

1. AT 6 OCTOBER STAFF MEETING, DURING DISCUSSION OF SD/UTTY/1 AFFAIR, CHARGE INSTRUCTED ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR TO CONTACT SDPROBE/1 AS LIKELY SOURCE ON ATMOSPHERICS OF THIS CASE. POLCOUNS RESPONDED IT PERHAPS BEST WAIT UNTIL DUST SETTLES. AS CHARGE HAS ON OTHER OCCASIONS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN P/1, WE CONCLUDED THAT THIS THE MOMENT TO SURFACE OUR CONTACT. CHARGE OBVIOUSLY CONTENT TO LEAVE THINGS AS THEY ARE, AND GIVEN POLCOUNS REACTION WE ANTICIPATE NO NEED FOR CEASE AND DESIST ORDER TO POLITICAL SECTION WHICH WOULD TEND TO REVEAL THE RELATIONSHIP.

2. UPSHOT WAS THAT CHARGE ASKED US TO EXPLORE WITH P/1 WHAT HE (AND WE) SEE AS INTENSIFIED IRANIAN PARANOIA. DISCUSSION OF THIS WITH P/1 LED TO SOME SPECULATION AS TO MEANS OF LIMITING THE ATTENDANT DAMAGE TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. P/1 SUGGESTED, AS HAS EDURN/1, THAT THERE OUGHT TO BE CONTACT WITH KHOMEINI. HE SAID HE THINKS EVEN A PRO FORMA EXPRESSION OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE REVOLUTION, AND OF CONCERN OVER STATE OF OUR RELATIONS, WOULD DO SOME GOOD. (NOT MENTIONED BY P/1 WAS POSSIBILITY THAT SUCH A MEETING, IF IT WENT ACCEPTABLY WELL, MIGHT OPEN UP MISSION OR STATION ACCESS TO OTHERS OF THE ULEMA.)

3. P/1 FIRST SUGGESTED DICK COTTAM AS GOOD CHOICE TO SEE KHOMEINI, EXPLAINING THIS ON BASIS THAT COTTAM HAS ALREADY MET HIM, AND FACT OF PRIOR ACQUAINTANCE CONSTITUTES SOME ADVANTAGE. P/1 SAID HE REGARDS APPROACH BY CHARGE OR OTHER U.S. OFFICIAL AN EQUALLY VIABLE APPROACH, AND CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE THINKS THAT FOR US TO KEEP OUR DISTANCE FROM KHOMEINI SIMPLY LEAVES THE FIELD TO INFLUENCES HOSTILE TO US. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE VOLUNTEERED THAT HE HAS NO IDEA WHO IN FACT DOES INFLUENCE KHOMEINI'S THINKING.

4. SUBSTANCE PARAS TWO AND THREE ABOVE HAS BEEN CONVEYED TO THE CHARGE

5. FILE: 201-237926. RVW 10 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET S E C R E T

19 Oct 79 2 E

S E C R E T 121714Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 531200. SECTION 1 OF 2.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN/R INFO DCNE/SAO, NE/INTEL, DEDS/EG/DDO/CS

SUBJECT: WNINTEL - GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR REPORTS.

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR SEPTEMBER NIT'S 10,710 THROUGH 10,720 REVIEWED 10 OCTOBER 1979.

RATING: 5

OBJECTIVE: S.1.B.
FIELD NO NIT-10,720 NO OPACT
DISSEM NO: TDFIRDB-315/15783-79, 9 SEPT 1979
UNILATERAL, SOURCE SDPROBE/1, FULL CONTROLS

BT
#9535

PAGE 4 WASHINGTON 531200 S E C R E T
SUBJECT: 1. KHOMEINI ATTITUDE TOWARD DEVELOPMENTS IN KURDISTAN;
2. ABSENCE OF IRAQI INTERVENTION IN KURDISTAN"
COMMENT: IT WAS USEFUL TO HAVE REPORTING ON HOW KHOMEINI VIEWED THE KURDISH SITUATION AT THE TIME OF THE CAPTURE OF THE KURDISH TOWNS. ALSO, AS STATION KNOWS, THERE CONTINUES TO BE ENDLESS SPECULATION ON POSSIBLE IRAQI INVOLVEMENT IN IRANIAN MINORITY MOVEMENTS. REPORT WAS USED IN ACSI BRIEF.

2. NO FILE. RVW 120CT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#9536

19 Oct 79 1 E

S E C R E T 181820Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 534861. SECTION 1 OF 2.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN/R INFO ADCNE; NE/INTEL

SUBJECT: WNINTEL - GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR REPORTS.

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR SEPTEMBER NIT'S 10,721 THROUGH 10,733. NIT-10,724 IS BEING REDRAFTED IN VIEW OF TEHRAN 54468.

OBJ: S.1.B.

NIT-10,721 NO OPACT TDFIRDB-315/15777-79 RATING: 5
9 SEPTEMBER 1979
UNILATERAL SDPROBE/1 CONTROLS: FULL

SUBJECT: "PROGRESS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS"

COMMENT: WE FEEL VERY FORTUNATE TO HAVE SDPROBE/1 IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO GIVE US REPORTING ON THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS, VERY MUCH OF INTEREST TO ANALYSTS. THEY WELCOME CONTINUED REPORTING ON THIS SUBJECT. REPORT WAS USED IN THE ACSI BRIEF.

OBJ: S.1.B.

NIT-10,722 NO OPACT TDFIRDB-315/15782-79 RATING: 5
9 SEPTEMBER 1979
UNILATERAL SDPROBE/1 CONTROLS: FULL

SUBJECT: "VIEWS OF RAHMATOLLAH MARAGHEH-MOQADDAM ON PROSPECTS FOR A NEW IRANIAN POLITICAL COALITION CENTERED ON THE MUSLIM PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY"

COMMENT: THIS WAS A GOOD ANALYSIS BY SDPROBE/1 ON SHARIAT-MADARI POSSIBLE MOVES IN THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM. ACCORDING TO GLEICHAUF SDJAMBLER TRIED TO TELL US SHARIAT-MADARI HAD FOLLOWERS

PAGE 2 WASHINGTON 534861 S E C R E T
AMONG THE MUJAHIDIN AND WE DIDN'T BELIEVE HIM. SDPEPPER/1 HAS NOW ALSO REPORTED THAT THERE IS A SHARIAT-MADARI FACTION IN THE MUJAHIDIN. REPORT WAS USED IN THE ACSI BRIEF.



REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT

COUNTRY: IRAN
SUBJECT: KHOMEINI'S REJECTION OF PROPOSAL TO DISSOLVE
OF EXPERTS (DOI: LATE OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A LIBERAL POLITICIAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN POLITI
GOVERNMENTAL CIRCLES. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY
BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FR
SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH EXCELLENT ACCESS.

1. AT A CABINET MEETING ON 19 OR 20 OCTOBER, 17 OF 22 MEMBERS
THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN ISSUED A PROCLAMATION, OFFERED
BY PRIME MINISTER MEHDI B A Z A R G A N, CALLING FOR THE DISSOLUTION
OF THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS WHICH IS REVISING THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION.
ON 21 OCTOBER, BAZARGAN AND FIVE OTHER CABINET MINISTERS WENT TO QOM
SEEK THE APPROVAL OF AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH K H O M E I N I. BAZARGAN
UED THAT THE ASSEMBLY IS EXCEEDING ITS AUTHORITY IN COMPLETELY
RITING THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION, AND THAT IT HAS EXCEEDED ITS
LEGITIMATE TENURE.

2. KHOMEINI CATEGORICALLY REJECTED THE PROPOSAL, AND
REBUKED BAZARGAN FOR SPONSORING IT. HE ACCUSED BAZARGAN
AND THE OTHER MINISTERS OF BEING IN LEAGUE WITH CRITICS OF THE ASSEMBLY
ESPECIALLY AYATOLLAH M. H. A D D A M - M A R A G E I AND OTHER
ASSOCIATED WITH THE MUSLIM PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY (MPRP).
(SOURCE COMMENT: KHOMEINI HAD ALREADY, IN A SPEECH ON 20 OCTOBER,
DENOUNCED THE CALLS FOR DISSOLUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY MADE AT THE
25 OCTOBER PUBLIC MEETING SPONSORED BY THE MPRP.) (FIELD COMMENT:
MII-10,784, IDF 108-315/1840[illegible]79, DESCRIBED A PROPOSAL TO PERSUADE
BAZARGAN TO DISSOLVE THE ASSEMBLY.)



3. PARTY AS A RESULT OF KHOMEINI VIRULENT R ACTION TO THE
DISSOLUTION PROPOSAL, THE LEADERS OF E MPRP, THE RADICAL MOVEM
AND THE NATIONAL FRONT HAVE POSTPONED MAL ANNOUN ME T OF A
COALITION OF THE THREE GROUPS. (SOURCE COMMENT: TH AL ICE
IS ALREADY A FACT, AND THE FRIDAY PUBLIC ETINGS SUC AS TH
SESSION ON 15 OCTOBER ARE SPONSORED BY ALL THREE GROUP .)

4. ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (25 OCTOBER 1979) FIELD NO. IT 1 788.

5. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE AT HE AT TEHR .
SENT TO MMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, ARACHI, KU IT,
MANAMA, W DELHI, TEL AVIV.

REPORT CLAS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES ND
METHODS INVO ED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONA --NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATIO
AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATO RVW
26 99 DRV DSC BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. AL PORTIONS
OF CLASSIFICA ON AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.



E C R E T 260852Z OCT 79 INTEL

TEHRAN 54597 ZNY XXXX

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MMAN, BEIRUT, C
KUWAIT, MANAMA, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV

EL ZRWAHOO

ROBE/I. DIRECTOR SEE TEHRAN 54596 NO
LIAISON. NO INDEX. NO FILE. EXDIS.
FIELD NO. WIT-10,788.

TDIRDC-315/



S E C R E T 260853Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54596

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL INTEL

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54597 (NIT-10,788)
B. TEHRAN 54598 (NIT-10,789)

1. SDPROBE/1 ACQUIRED PARAS ONE AND [illegible] FROM [illegible]
MINISTER JAVADI, WHO ACCOMPANIED BAZARGA[illegible] TO QOM; [illegible]/1 ON
PARTICIPATED IN PARA THREE DECISION.

2. P/1 ACQUIRED REF B INFO DIRECTLY FROM SHARIAT-MADARI
IN QOM ON 25 OCTOBER.

3. NO FILE. RVW 260CT99. DRV D9C.E. ALL SECRET

S E C R E T



S E C R E T 260810Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54599

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDPROBE

1. AT 25 OCTOBER MEETING, SDPROBE/1 SAID HE CALLED ON
DURING HIS 28 VISIT TO QOM. HE SAID THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
PRACTICE AT KHOMEINI'S COURT, HE WAS PLACED IN A GROUP OF OTHER
VISITORS BEFORE BEING USHERED INTO THE PRESENCE. HE SAID THAT
DURING THIS SESSION, KHOMEINI REFUSED TO MEET HIS KEY AIDES AND LAY
MESSRS WHO REQUESTED PRIVATE MEETING. HE WAS TOLD THAT KHOMEINI
TO SEE/1 IN.

2. P/1 SAID HE THINKS THE GESTURE MAY HAVE BEEN WORTHWHILE
ANYWAY. HE ADDED THAT SHARIAT-MADARI COULD HAVE SELLED HIM SAME DAY VO
PROVOKE THE KIND OF PUNITIVE ACTION SUFFERED BY HASSAN NAZIH. W
TOOK THE LIBERTY OF SECONDING THAT MOTION

3. FILE: 201-237926. RVW 260CT99. DRV D9C.E. ALL SECRET
E C R E T

AMERICAN EMBASSY, TEHRAN L.O.U.

REFERRAL OF VISA APPLICANT

(Category II)

44 Rmc DATE: 29 OCTOBER 1979

TO : Consular Section
FROM: Referring Officer:
THRU: Approving Officer: THOMAS L. AHERN

I request a waiver of personal appearance for the following applicant(s) who I believe meet the criteria for such waiver:

Name: RAHMATOLLAH MARAGHE MOGHADAM

Documents Included: PPT, NIV APPLICATION AND PHOTO

Justification: PER ORAL CONVERSATION

L.O.U.

2 Nov 79 11 39Z

SECRET 012217Z NOV 79 STAFF

DTE DIRECTOR 544541.

TO: TEHRAN.

INFO: AMEMBASSY ANKARA SPPROBE

1. SPPROBE/1 GRANTED POA 26 OCT 1979.

2. FILE 201-237926. RVW 01NOV99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET

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#6354

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SD PROBE/1. MR. MOGADDAM - MARAGHEH.
FORMER GOVERNOR OF EAST AZERBAIJAN.
MEMBER OF ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS.
AGE: 55-60. ADDRESS: NORTH SIDE OF
MIR-E-DAMAD, NEAR NAFT. MARRIED,
ONE SON AT SCHOOL IN U.S. EUROPEAN
LANGUAGES: FRENCH, ENGLISH. INTRO-
DUCTION BY JAPANESE DIPLOMAT, MR.
HASEGAWA, AT MR. M'S HOME, IN AUG'S
MEETINGS AT SAME PLACE, WEEKLY
PURPOSE OF CONTACT: ① INFORMATION
ON PROGRESS OF ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS;
② INFORMATION ON ORGANIZATION AND
MEMBERSHIP OF IRANIAN POLITICAL
PARTIES; ③ INFORMATION ON PROGRESS AND
PROBLEMS OF THE REVOLUTION; ④ VIEWS
ON IRAN-U.S. RELATIONS.
RE ①: PRIMARY EMPHASIS WAS ON
QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, I.E., ROLE OF
CLERGY, ROLE OF PEOPLE, VELAYAT-E-
FAQIH ETC. ALSO: DESCRIPTION OF
ASSEMBLY PROCEEDINGS, ESPECIALLY ON
ARTICLES 5 AND 15.
RE ②: INFORMAL STRUCTURE AND AZERBAI-
JANI ETHNIC BASE OF SHARIAT-MADARI'S
PARTY; S-M'S AND MR. M'S PROGRAM
TO BROADEN THE BASE OF SUPPORT FOR
3 THE REVOLUTION VIA ELECTIONS TO THE

Real Name: Hassan Nazieh.

Code Name: S. D. Putty.

According to the document No. 1, Nazieh was in contact with C. I. A. before August 2, 1979 and even prior to the victory of the Islamic Revolution. The C. I. A. had again expressed willingness to establish contacts with Nazieh through Josef W. Adelsick (Adelsick was the deputy chief and later the chief of the Tehran-based C. I. A. station in pre-revolution years). In this connection the C. I. A. tried to get information on Nazieh's schedueled trips outside of Iran.

C. I. A. headquarters informed the C. I. A. station in Tehran to postpone the plan until Adelsick's arrival in Tehran, so that he could evaluate Nazieh's willingness to co-operate in a briefing session that was supposed to be held prior to October 1979 when Nazieh was to meet with the station's officer.

3 AUG 79

S E C R E T 021343Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 487419.

TO: IMMEDIATE LONDON, PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

REFS: A. LONDON 16438
B. PARIS 11196

1. CONCUR KILTINGER TDY FRANCE TO MEET FATOLLAH. PROCESSING POA.

2. IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH FATOLLAH, PLS TRY TO DETERMINE ANY AND ALL TRAVEL PLANS OF NAZIH (IDEN) IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. HQS WOULD LIKE TO REESTABLISH CONTACT OUTSIDE OF IRAN BETWEEN NAZIH AND HIS FORMER REACTION CONTACT, JOSEPH W. ADLESICK, AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

3. FILE: 201-229725. RVW 1AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 021353Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 487429.

TO: IMMEDIATE LONDON, PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

REFS: DIRECTOR 487419

1. IDEN IS SOPUTTY/1.

2. FILE: 201-229725. RVW 01AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T



16 Sep 79 ? 50

S E C R E T 1512174 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE KUWAIT 30020

TOR PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL SDCOS/O

REF: KUWAIT 30021 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: S/A OBTAINED REF FROM AN OFFICIAL (NFI)
OF NIOC WHILE ESCORTING S/A TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR VISIT TO
KUWAIT IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1979 OF NIOC DIRECTOR HASSAN N A
S/A DID NOT GIVE SPECIFICS OF WHAT WAS TO BE DISCUSSED DURING
THE VISIT.

2. S/A QUESTIONED S/A CLOSELY ON THE REASON FOR THE
TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS, AND S/A WAS ADAMANT THAT THE REASONS CITED
REF AND SUBSEQUENT THAT THE NIOC OFFICIAL GAVE.

3. S/A PLANS TO MEET WHEN SDVARY/1 RETURNS FROM HIS CURRENT
VISIT TO TEHRAN. S/A WILL QUESTION HIM ABOUT THE SITUATION
THERE.

4. S/A ALSO REPORTED THAT HE HAS HEARD FROM SEVERAL RECENT
TRAVELLERS FROM IRAN THAT THE PLO/FATAH OFFICES IN TEHRAN AND
AHWAZ HAVE BEEN CLOSED. THE TEHRAN OFFICE WAS CLOSED ON THE
ORDERS OF KHOMEINI WHO WANTED FACILITIES, AT THE ORDER OF THE GO
THE AHWAZ OFFICE WAS CLOSED AT THE ORDER OF ADMIRAL MADANI,
GOVERNOR OF KHUZESTAN PROVINCE. BOTH CLOSURES WERE CARRIED OUT
QUIETLY AND WITHOUT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS ACCORDING TO S/A'S
SOURCES.

5. FILE: 201-0961986. RVW 15SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

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

20 Sep 79 (? 39

S E C R E T 1923272 SEP 79 STAFF

OFFICE DIRECTOR 316999.

TO: PRIORITY KUWAIT INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL SDCOS/O SDPUTTY

REF: KUWAIT 30020

SDPUTTY/1: THE NIOC OFFICIAL REFERRED TO IN PARA ONE HA
OUTSIDE/1, WITH WHOM WE VERY INTERESTED IN ARRANGING CO

2. PLS
DISCREETLY PURSUE P/I VISIT KUWAIT
HQS AND TEHRAN INFORMED OF P/I'S ITINERARY, PROVIDING AS MU
DVANCE NOTICE AS POSSIBLE, SO TDY BY P/I FORMER CASE OFFICE
N BE ARRANGED.

3. FOR TEHRAN, REQUEST ANY INPUT ON P/I TRAVEL WHICH
BE AVAILABLE TO YOU.

4. FILE: 201-229725. RVW 19SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
R E T

S E C R E T 260023Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 520874.

TO: PRIORITY TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT SDPUTTY

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54311
B. STOCKHOLM 26210

1. APPRECIATE STATION INITIATIVE. A THIRD CHOICE IS TO DEFER PLANS UNTIL ADLESICK ARRIVES TEHRAN AND STATION CAN MOVE AHEAD AGAINST SDPUTTY/1 IN TANDEM WITH HIM. FYI: IT TENTATIVE HQS PLAN FOR ADLESICK TO TDY TEHRAN FOR OCTOBER BRIEFING MENTIONED REF B. THIS HAS ADVANTAGE OF ALLOWING CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF SDPUTTY/1 WILLINGNESS COOPERATE BY ADLESICK BEFORE STATION OFFICER EXPOSED TO P/1.

2. IF HOWEVER STATION BELIEVES IT SHOULD MOVE NOW, AGREE BEST ARRANGE THROUGH SDPROBE/1. IN SUCH EVENT, THERE MIGHT BE CERTAIN COVER ADVANTAGES IN NOT USING ADLESICK'S NAME.

3. FILE: 201-229725; 201-237926. RVW 25 SEP 99
DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#8783

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978 - 281-526



TDFIRDB-315/19350-79
DIST: 02 NOVEMBER 1979
S IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
ORM. CLASSIFICATION WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON
HUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED IN FINAL PARAGRAPH.
NTRY:
JECT: FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY
HASSAN NAZIH UNDER PROTECTION OF AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-
MADARI (DOI: EARLY OCTOBER 1979)
RCE: A FORMER SENIOR IRANIAN MILITARY OFFICER WHO IS AN
UNKNOWN DEGREE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY. HE IS BELIEVED
TO HAVE GOOD ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION CITED BELOW.
1. FORMER PRIME MINISTER SHAHPOUR B A K H T I A R AND
ENTOURAGE HAVE RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE FORMER DIRECTOR
THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY HASSAN N A Z I H IS UN-
ING IN THE TEHRAN HOME OF AYATOLLAH SEYED KAZEM S H A R I A T
MADARI. NAZIH WENT INTO HIDING IN THE AYATOLLAH'S HOME
AFTER HE WAS FIRED FROM HIS JOB AS DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
IRANIAN OIL COMPANY IN A GOVERNMENT SHAKEUP IN EARLY OCTOBER
NAZIH AT THAT TIME BECAME THE SUBJECT OF THE TEHRAN
QUESTION PROSECUTOR'S INVESTIGATION WHICH LED TO A WARRAN
HIS ARREST. NAZIH APPARENTLY HAS BEEN ABLE TO USE THE
TRADITION PROVIDED BY SHARIAT-MADARI'S POSITION TO KEEP HIMSELF
FROM BEING BROUGHT TO TRIAL.

2. BAKHTIAR'S GROUPS ALSO BELIEVE THAT NAZIH HAS TAKEN
WITH HIM DOCUMENTS WHICH PROVE THAT SUBSTANTIAL IRANIAN
REVENUES HAVE BEEN PASSED TO THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION
ORGANIZATION (PLO). THESE GROUPS BELIEVE THAT THESE DOCUMENTS
MAKE PUBLIC WOULD ASSIST BAKHTIAR'S MOVEMENT IN
DISCREDITING THAT THE KHOMEINI GOVERNMENT HAS ESTABLISHED MUC
SECRET THAT THE PLO SUPPORT IS GENERALLY ASSUMED AND WOULD
WHAT AT A TIME OF SEVERE ECONOMIC CRISIS IRANIAN MONEY IS
NG FUNNELED OUT OF THE COUNTRY.

3. [illegible]2(1 NOVEMBER 1979)

4. [illegible] SENT TO TEHRAN, LONDON, PARIS, BEIRUT